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ABSTRACT
Atticus Finch, protagonist of Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird and longtime hero 
of the American bar, is well known, but he is not well understood. This article unlocks 
the secret to his status as the most admired of fictional attorneys by demonstrating 
the role that his rhetoric plays in his exemplary fulfillment of the duties of an attorney 
to zealously represent clients, to serve as an officer of the court, and to act as a 
public citizen with a special responsibility for the quality of justice. Always using 
the simplest accurate wording, focusing on reason over emotion, and speaking in 
the same manner whether in private or in public, Atticus’s rhetoric exemplifies the 
ancient Roman style known by students of rhetoric as “Attic.” Using this style to 
navigate the potential for conflict among his duties, Atticus reveals the power, the 
elegance, and the ethical necessity of Attic rhetoric. Connecting Atticus’s name to the 
Attic style of rhetoric for the first time, this article advances several scholarly debates 
by demonstrating the mutual compatibility of the duties imposed by the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct and proffering a powerful tool to attorneys seeking to 
practice or to teach improved ethical conduct.
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Introduction
The Atticus Finch of To Kill a Mockingbird has served as a role model for 
generations of American attorneys1 and schoolchildren,2 but scholarship analyzing 
this fictional attorney has never focused with sufficient clarity on his use of the most 
important weapon that a lawyer wields: words. And yet it should be evident that, 
as an attorney, Atticus’s words are an important part of who he is. As renowned 
scholar of legal writing and speaking, Brian Garner, explains, “There are only two 
things that lawyers do professionally, and they are to speak persuasively and to 
write persuasively. That really exhausts the whole gamut of skills that lawyers 
engage in. Words are our only tools.”3 If Professor Garner is correct that effective 
rhetoric is synonymous with an attorney’s skill and power, then Atticus’s use of 
words should provide a superlative source of insight into the power of his character 
and thereby explain why so many American attorneys have implicitly adopted him 
as their patron saint. It is natural that Atticus’s rhetoric should be the source of his 
grip on the imagination (such as it is) of the American attorney.4 
1 Attorneys have so dearly loved Atticus Finch that in 2010 the American Bar Association 
playfully removed him from the running for their list of the twenty-five greatest fictional 
lawyers. Thane Rosenbaum, ABA Honors “To Kill a Mockingbird” and Atticus Finch, 
A.B.A. J., Aug. 10, 2010, at 30, 30–31. An article in the online journal explained that 
his fellow fictional attorneys could not bear competition with Atticus’s “demigod” 
status: “Since the moment he was introduced 50 years ago in Harper Lee’s novel, To 
Kill a Mockingbird, Atticus Finch has represented both an image lawyers crave and a 
standard that intimidates them. . . . [He is] a legal deity too lofty to allow comparison to a 
Denny Crane or a Patty Hewes.” Richard Sweren, Farewell, Atticus, A.B.A. J., Aug. 10, 
2010, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/farewell_atticus. Numerous sources 
confirm Atticus’s power to inspire the love and emulation of attorneys and children who 
will become attorneys. See, e.g., Stephen D. Easton & Julie A. Oseid, Essay, “And Bad 
Mistakes? I’ve Made a Few”: Sharing Mistakes to Mentor New Lawyers, 77 Alb. L. Rev. 
499, 526–28 (2013/14) (describing an “Atticus Finch case” as representation undertaken 
“not because you think you have a great chance of winning the case, but because it 
is the right thing to do”); Mary Ellen Maatman, Justice Formation from Generation 
to Generation: Atticus Finch and the Stories Lawyers Tell Their Children, 14 Legal 
Writing 2017, 208–9 (2008) (describing many ways that Atticus has inspired lawyers 
and aspiring attorneys); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Law and Popular Culture: Can They 
Do That? Legal Ethics in Popular Culture: of Characters and Acts, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 
1305, 1307, 1310 (referring to the virtual “canonization” of Atticus). 
2 With over forty million copies sold, some estimate that as many as 70 percent of 
American high school students are assigned the novel. Alexandra Alter, Harper Lee, 
Author of “To Kill a Mockingbird,” Is to Publish a Second Novel, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
3, 2015, at A1; Courtney Crowder, Marja Mills Addresses Harper Lee Controversy at 
Literary Event, Chi. Trib., July 23, 2014, at 6, §4.
3 AmicusCuriae200, Bryan Garner’s Persuasive Oral Argument, You Tube (Sept. 3, 
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJRDKRGo-UE.
4 Notwithstanding the prevailing adulation for Atticus, serious challenges have been raised 
to the character’s position as role model—even before the publication of Go Set the 
Watchman. Some of the most highly noted challenges have accused Atticus of sexism, 
complicity in society’s racism, or both. Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch—Right and 
Wrong, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 473 (1994); Steven Lubet, Classics Revisited: Reconstructing 
Atticus Finch, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1339 (1999); Malcolm Gladwell, The Courthouse Ring: 
Atticus Finch and the Limits of Southern Liberalism, New Yorker, Aug. 10, 2009, 
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The evidence necessary to support this claim—the claim that Atticus’s speech 
is worthy of emulation and therefore should be better understood—lies in the 
power of his speech as it plays out within the novel. But the character’s name 
gives additional evidence of the importance of Atticus’s use of words, and this 
evidence proves essential to understanding—rather than merely observing and 
admiring—the full contribution of Atticus to his fictional town and of Harper Lee to 
the American attorneys who model themselves after Atticus. This article argues that 
Lee named Atticus Finch, specifically the Atticus Finch of To Kill a Mockingbird, 
after an ancient school of rhetoric known as Attic. Atticus Finch speaks with all 
the hallmarks of the Attic orator: he never raises his voice above a polite tone; he 
uses the same tone and vocabulary at home and in the courtroom; and he employs 
simple, accurate phrases instead of impassioned eloquence. Atticus’s practice of 
Attic rhetoric thus presents an important counterpoint to the perennial American 
fear of the aggressive, threatening, and sometimes abusive trial lawyer—the lawyer 
least likely to persuade by reason and most likely to prevail through arousal of 
some passion, whether it be fear, hatred, or mere selfishness. Nonetheless, there is 
almost no scholarship on To Kill a Mockingbird that so much as mentions Atticus’s 
rhetorical style, very little that considers his oratory from a legal ethics perspective, 
and none that connects him to the Attic style of oratory.5 
Atticus’s rhetoric—standing in opposition to the passion-arousing style 
typically associated with the most negative stereotype of the courtroom 
attorney—connects the optimistic vein running through To Kill a Mockingbird with 
the integrity of the legal profession and the potential for rational deliberation within 
the American legal system. The importance of this connection lies in teaching 
attorneys—and indeed Americans more broadly—why we admire Atticus and 
intuitively model ourselves after him. To the extent that attorneys voluntarily shape 
at 26–32; Deborah Luyster, Crossing the Bar: The Column of the Legal Education 
Committee: Lawyering Skills in Law and Literature, 81 Mich. B. J. 56, 56 (2002); see 
also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1316, 1333 (questioning Atticus’s parenting and 
arguing that he “is no longer the uncomplicated hero that we once thought when we 
measure him against current standards of complicity with a wrongfully racist society”). 
Atticus’s detractors elicited a resounding defense of the bar’s most beloved hero, and 
the 2015 publication of Go Set the Watchman has since given rise to a fresh round of 
debate. Davis Margolick, At the Bar; To Attack a Lawyer in “To Kill a Mockingbird”: 
An Iconclast Takes Aim at a Hero, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1992, at B7; Claudia Johnson, 
Without Tradition and Within Reason: Judge Horton and Atticus Finch in Court, 45 
Ala. L. Rev. 483, 483–87 (1994); Rapping, supra note 4. Atticus’s character in Go Set 
the Watchman fueled the anti-Atticus camp; his defenders responded by arguing that 
the new novel’s Atticus is a draft of a fictional character whose traits Lee evidently 
determined to alter to create the Atticus of To Kill a Mockingbird. Rapping, id. at 862–
63; Adam Gopnik, Sweet Home Alabama: Harper Lee’s “Go Set a Watchman,” New 
Yorker, July 27, 2015, at 66. I side with the latter camp, setting Go Set the Watchman 
aside as a separate literary work whose characters do not bear on the interpretation of To 
Kill a Mockingbird.
5 The only exception that the author has been able to find is Brooke Richelle Holland’s 
Classical Rhetoric in Atticus Finch’s Speeches, 105 Eng. J. 78 (2006). Contrary to 
my argument, Holland argues that Atticus speaks in the low, middle, and high styles 
described by Cicero. Id. at 81–82. Holland does not diagnose Atticus’s exclusive use of 
the Attic style; much less does she connect this style to Lee’s choice of name for Atticus 
Finch.
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themselves in Atticus’s image, rules of ethics, professionalism, and civility become, 
to a very great extent,6 a matter of course. Attorneys who strive to be like Atticus 
will fulfill many of their obligations without stopping to think about what they 
ought not to do. Of course, there will always be those who refuse to resolve to do 
the right thing for the right reason, but this article is written in the belief that many 
attorneys do intend, as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explain, to carry 
a “special responsibility for the nature of justice.”7 For attorneys who embrace this 
responsibility, understanding (rather than merely intuitively admiring) the logic 
underpinning Atticus’s speech will educate and sharpen the ability to follow his 
articulate example. If Lee taught attorneys to love Atticus and to wish to be like 
him, as I believe To Kill a Mockingbird shows us that she did, this article seeks to 
make it a bit plainer how we can imitate him and why it is important for us to do so. 
And, if Brian Garner is right about the extent of the legal tool kit, nothing could be 
more important to any upstanding American attorney. 
This argument proceeds in three parts. The first part makes the case for why 
a literary figure should be studied to improve legal ethics and then makes the case 
for a need in improvement of ethics in the American bar. Even after a century 
of articulating and rearticulating standards of ethics, professionalism, and civility, 
legal ethics should turn to literature because the profession continues to struggle 
with both a perceived decline in ethics and fundamental fault lines that have haunted 
attorney identity for centuries. 
The second part makes the case for Atticus Finch as a salutary literary role 
model whose specific strengths address both concerns about a decline in general 
civility and the potential for attorney identity to splinter amidst the sometimes 
conflicting duties governing an attorney’s professional and personal life. Atticus 
not only carries out the duties imposed by the profession, he does so—without 
raising his voice—while navigating profound potential for conflict among his 
duties. As a comparison of his character to the aspirational Preamble of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct demonstrates, Atticus illustrates how the seemingly 
incompatible expectations placed on an attorney by the traditions of the profession 
can be fulfilled under difficult circumstances. 
The third part connects Atticus’s holistic, civil fulfillment of his duties 
as an attorney to his rhetoric, arguing that analysis and understanding of his 
rhetorical style reveal both the tools that permit Atticus to successfully fulfill his 
role as attorney and the underlying beliefs that permit him to do so even under 
circumstances where it might appear that his duties and interests are in conflict 
with one another. Lee named Atticus after the ancient, Attic school of rhetoric, so 
it is not surprising that the characteristics of this school’s rhetoric—particularly 
when compared to more bombastic and passionate styles—unlock the logic behind 
the character’s integrity. Cicero described and critiqued Attic rhetoric at length, 
describing its simple strengths but also arguing that it lacked the power exhibited 
in the speech of the greatest orators. Despite his critique, Cicero’s descriptions of 
the clear, rational elegance of Attic rhetoric demonstrate how this style exemplifies 
the fulfillment of an attorney’s simultaneous duties to truth, justice, civility, and his 
6 This is not to claim that all ethics requirements are intuitive; even Atticus Finch might 
consult the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance on more technical 
questions. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5, 5.4 (2013). 
7 Id. pmbl. ¶ 1. 
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or her client’s interests. Thus, Atticus’s rhetorical style points to a resolution of the 
seeming conflict between an attorney’s duties to client and to the court, justice, and 
personal integrity. 
In closing, I focus on the consistency of Atticus’s rhetoric across the many 
aspects of his life—as an attorney, as a citizen, and as a father. In the final analysis, 
Atticus’s Attic rhetoric—as Cicero’s discussion of rhetoric will have made clear—
proves a key component of more than his skill as an attorney. His rhetorical style 
is grounded in honesty and respect for the ultimate deliberative capacity of others. 
Coupled with the courage for which he has long been admired, Atticus’s honest yet 
restrained use of speech (his greatest weapon) contains a microcosm of the restraint 
that members of the judiciary and bar should exhibit in relationship to the greater 
whole—the democracy within which they reside. 
I. How Atticus Can Help Attorney Ethics
A. Literary Studies in Ethics Education
Attorneys lead their lives amid a forest of duties, not least important among them the 
duties that guide and control the practice of law itself: the canons, rules, regulations, 
culture, and expectations that shape the conduct of an attorney. The twentieth 
century witnessed a great increase in the formality and enforceability of ethical 
duties governing attorneys, but the extent to which the formal pronouncements, 
whether enforceable or aspirational, improve attorney behavior is itself a contended 
issue. Some cheer the articulation of enforceable codes of conduct, arguing that 
enforcement of detailed rules is the only path to an ethical bar.8 Others question 
the efficacy of formal standards, pointing instead to an underlying defect in the 
dispositions of attorneys who either believe “churlish” behavior appropriate or 
simply lack the virtue required to make the right decisions.9 Those who question the 
sufficiency of rules often call for some degree of culture change, citing possibilities 
as divergent as altering the adversarial nature of the practice of law, training young 
attorneys in virtue, or enhancing the shouldering of responsibility by firms and 
individual attorneys.10 
8 Heather M. Kolinsky, Just Because You Can Doesn’t Mean You Should: Reconciling 
Attorney Conduct in the Context of Defamation with the New Professionalism, 37 Nova 
L. Rev. 113, 117–20 (2012); Amelia Craig Cramer, Linda Drake, & Mariam Diggins, 
Civility for Arizona Lawyers: Essential, Endangered, Enforceable, 6 Phoenix L. Rev. 
465, 467–68, 503–4 (2013); Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of 
Lawyers, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693, 694, 727–28, 740–41, 748–49 (2006). 
9 Thomas Gibbs Gee & Bryan A. Garner, The Uncivil Lawyer: A Scourge at the Bar, 15 
Rev. Litig. 177, 190 (1996); Mark Neal Aaronson, Symposium: Race, Gender, Power, 
and the Public Interest: Perspective on Professionalism: Be Just to One Another: 
Preliminary Thoughts on Civility, Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 St. Thomas 
L. Rev. 113, 114–19 (1995).
10 Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts 
of the Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 809, 834–35 (1998); 
Aaronson, supra note 9, at 143–45, 153–55; Cramer, Drake, & Diggins, supra note 8, at 
468–69. 
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Culture shifts and virtue-enhancing attorney education may initially appear 
hopelessly unattainable, but advocates point to the potential for firm mentoring and 
shadowing programs, stress-management training, and expanded law-school and 
continuing-legal-education curricula.11 Among the suggestions for how to expand 
legal education are interdisciplinary studies—such as the study of literature and 
rhetoric.12 Law and literature studies are not new, and indeed such scholarship has 
forayed into many corners of practice.13 Not surprisingly, more than one scholar has 
underscored the potential for literature to play a role in narrowing the gap between 
actual practice and good ethics.14 Like mentoring programs, the study of literature 
circumnavigates some of the common complaints against both mandatory and 
aspirational rules. Perhaps most importantly, studying legal ethics through literature 
does not establish minimum standards. Rather, it focuses attention on understanding 
and creating the best resolution to any dilemma. Furthermore, the solution offered 
comes in the format most familiar to common-law-trained attorneys: embedded in 
a particular factual scenario and ready to be analyzed, distilled, and critiqued—like 
any judicial opinion. Moreover, like mentoring, the study of literature requires no 
formal structure: it is well suited to individual pursuit, informal discussion, law-
school classrooms, and continuing legal education through bar programs. 
11 Aaronson, supra note 9, at 116, 125; Mark D. Nozette & Robert A. Creamer, Expecting 
Too Much and Too Little, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 1539, 1553–56 (2006); Susan Daicoff, Asking 
Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions 
to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney 
Personality Attributes, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 547, 569–73 (1998); Brenda Smith, 
Comment, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the “Civil” War over Proper Attorney 
Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 Dayton L. Rev. 151, 182–84 (1998).
12 Aaronson, supra note 9, at 125. 
13 Literature may, for example, help legal scholars grapple with complex scientific and 
medical issues that are accompanied by legal quandaries. David Caudill, Law and 
Literature, Literature and Science, and Enhancing the Discourse of Law/Science 
Relations, 27 J. Legal Prof. 1, 3 (2003); Jennifer Bard, Thomas Mayo, & Stacy Tovino, 
Three Ways of Looking at a Health Law and Literature Class, 1 Drexel Law Rev. 512 
(2009). Analysis of the popular perception of attorneys and the judicial system also lends 
itself to television and film studies. Naomi Mezey & Mark Niles, Screening the Law: 
Ideology and Law in American Popular Culture, 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 91 (2005); 
Steven Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police 
as Television Heroes, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 229 (1987); Kimberlianne Podlas, Cross-
Examination: The Great (?) Engine: Article: Impact of Television on Cross-Examination 
and Juror “Truth,” 14 Widener L. Rev. 479 (2009); Kimberlianne Podlas, Guilty on All 
Accounts: Law and Order’s Impact on Public Perception of Law and Order, 18 Seton 
Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 1 (2008); Adam Shniderman, Ripped from the Headlines: 
Juror Perceptions in the Law & Order Era, 38 Law & Psychol. Rev. 97, 97–133 (2014); 
Diane Klein, Ally McBeal and Her Sisters: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of 
Representations of Women Lawyers on Prime-Time Television, 18 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 
259, 259–305 (1998).
14 Philip Kissam, Disruptions of Literature: Disturbing Images: Literature in a 
Jurisprudence Course, 22 Legal Stud. Forum 329, 347–48 (1998); Menkel-Meadow, 
supra note 1, at 1307; Caudill, supra note 13, at 2; but see Jane Baron, Law, Literature, 
and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 Yale L.J. 1059 (1999) (critiquing the 
internal coherence, utility, and theoretical grounding of law and literature studies).
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Even more than mentoring relationships, literature by its very nature translates 
theory and maxim to concrete application.15 This is particularly valuable to the 
common-law lawyer, whose education and professional habits have trained the mind 
to weave ceaselessly between general rule and particular application. Literature, 
however, offers something that the casebook cannot: it follows attorney, judge, 
client, and whoever else may inhabit the story beyond the immediate purview of the 
legally relevant and into both the broader public arena16 and the narrower private 
stories of the characters’ personal and inner lives. As literature follows a lawyer 
into the private sphere, it unearths the interplay between professional and private 
self,17 thereby exploring a connection that escapes the rules of professional conduct. 
Because the fictional attorney’s underlying ethical choices are normally expressed 
in novel form through professional speech, attorney rhetoric—with all its ethical 
implications—is simultaneously under the glass and ready for examination.18 
Given these advantages to studying law through fiction, to say nothing of 
the pleasure thereby afforded, it is not surprising that a literature both deep and 
wide has developed.19 Legal scholarship of recent years alone boasts forays into 
the philosophical Franz Kafka,20 the perennial favorite Shakespeare,21 and the 
fanciful and popular Harry Potter world.22 To Kill a Mockingbird and Atticus 
15 Luyster, supra note 4, at 56 (arguing that literature shows how abstraction of a legal rule 
works in the context of the particulars of human lives). Menkel-Meadow argues that the 
concrete application that occurs in literature is central to the enthusiasm with which her 
students respond to studying legal ethics in literature, supra note 1, at 1325–26.
16 Literature can assist in the formulation of what “law” is, helping attorneys to explore the 
“tension between positive law and natural law.” Luyster, supra note 4, at 56. Because 
attorneys act at the intersection between law as it actually is and law as it ought to be, 
the choices of “a lawyer of good character” exhibit the “tension” between “commitment 
to law and commitment to justice.” Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1324. While the 
resulting, tension-ridden stories can produce “disturbing images of lawyers’ ethics,” 
(Kissam, supra note 14, at 347), these images provide insights about the impact of law 
in a society as a whole (Bruce Rockwood, The Good, the Bad, and the Ironic: Two Views 
on Law and Literature, 8 Yale J.L. & Human. 533, 534 (1996) (book review)). 
17 Legal scholars have noted that literature provides an opportunity to study the relationship 
between the public and private lives of attorneys. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 
1308–9 (2001); Kristin Huston, Comment, The Lawyer as Savior: What Literature Says 
about the Attorney’s Role in Redemption, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 161, 164 (2004). Thomas 
Morawetz draws the interesting observation that whether a story ultimately shows 
the practice of law to ennoble or dehumanize an attorney will depend on the author’s 
estimation of the law. Review Essay, Ethics and Style: The Lessons of Literature for 
Law, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 502 (1993). 
18 More generally, some argue that literary theory offers legal reasoning a rich resource 
for understanding how texts mean and how they can legitimately be interpreted. Gary 
Minda, Law and Literature at Century’s End, 9 Cardozo Stud. L. & Lit. 245, 245 
(1997); Morawetz, supra note 17, at 497; Cathren Page, Not So Very Bad Beginnings: 
What Fiction Can Teach Lawyers about Beginning a Persuasive Legal Narrative Before 
a Court, 86 Miss. L.J. 315 (2017). 
19 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1307–8. 
20 Patrick Glen, Franz Kafka, Lawrence Joseph, and the Possibilities of Jurisprudential 
Literature, 21 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 47 (2011).
21 Frank Kermode, Justice and Mercy in Shakespeare, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1155 (1996).
22 Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 67 
(2010); Jeffrey Thomas, The Power of Stories: Intersections of Law, Literature, and 
Culture: Harry Potter, Law and Culture: Harry Potter and the Law, 12 Tex. Wesleyan 
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Finch, of course, appear with relative frequency, and more often than not the 
theme relates in some way to legal ethics—given a broad understanding of the 
subject: Atticus’s name is invoked as an example of attorney courage,23 in support 
of the importance of pro bono work,24 and to illustrate the extralegal role that 
attorneys play in the lives of their families and greater communities.25 Before 
delving deeper into why Atticus has been selected as the object of study in this 
article, the following section sketches the contemporary ethical landscape within 
which he is analyzed.
B. Enduring Tensions and New Rules in Legal Ethics
Scholarship on the origins of American legal ethics tends to commence with one 
particular landmark figure, George Sharswood, author of An Essay on Professional 
Ethics.26 During the nineteenth century, Sharswood and other American legal 
scholars debated the ethical limitations that ought to guide attorney behavior.27 
During this period, state bar associations made efforts to impose ethics duties 
through the adoption, first of the Field Code, and later of the 1887 Alabama Code 
of Ethics, which would serve as the model for new codes in ten additional states.28 
By the twentieth century, the American Bar Association took the lead in the 
development of three additional promulgations that would be followed across the 
nation.29 The 1908 Canons of Ethics was modeled on the Alabama Code, and this 
was followed by the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the 1983 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.30 
Since the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, legal ethics 
has seen two additional movements take shape: in addition to the ethics norms found 
in the professional rules, some jurisdictions have developed professionalism and 
civility standards.31 Overlap does exist among the areas of ethics, professionalism, 
L. Rev. 427 (2005); Aaron Schwabach, Harry Potter and the Unforgivable Curses: 
Norm-formation, Inconsistency, and the Rule of Law in the Wizarding World, 11 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 309 (2006).
23 Caudill, supra note 13, at 2.
24 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 1329. 
25 Huston, supra note 17, at 179. 
26 Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A Historical 
Perspective, 63 Case W. Res. 381, 382–83, 404–12 (2012) (providing an overview 
of prominent nineteenth-century Anglo-American statements of legal ethics); Russell 
G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992) (detailing the contribution of Sharswood’s work to the 
substantive content of contemporary rules of legal ethics).
27 Andrews, supra note 26, at 384, 412–19; Pearce, supra note 26, at 260, 241–45.
28 Andrews, supra note 26, at 384, 412–19 (2012); Pearce, supra note 26, at 260, 241–45 (1992).
29 Andrews, supra note 26, at 419–20 (2012).
30 Id. at 419–20, 435–39 (2012) (concluding that the primary contours of the ethical 
limitations on attorneys has been largely constant despite minor adjustments between the 
various American statements of legal ethics); see also Pearce, supra note 26, at 246–47.
31 David A. Grenardo, Making Civility Mandatory: Moving From Aspired to Required, 11 
Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 239, 245 (2013) (explaining that “civility is also 
linked to professionalism and ethics”); Thomas E. Richard, Professionalism: What Rules 
Do We Play By?, 30 S.U. L. Rev. 15, 18 (2002) (“Although some argue professionalism 
and legal ethics are synonymous, they differ significantly” (citations omitted)).
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and civility, and sometimes the terms are even used synonymously.32 Nonetheless, 
broad distinctions can be discerned. Ethical duties, doubtless the most familiar 
to practitioners, are considered synonymous with the state rules of professional 
conduct that regulate attorney conduct.33 These rules of professional conduct 
are a “matter of law” and are therefore enforceable.34 Professionalism norms, in 
contrast to the rules of professional conduct, result from attempts to “establish 
lofty standards that attorneys should follow.”35 Professionalism does not 
therefore lend itself to clear codification; rather, it is a realm of conscience in 
which reasonable minds will differ.36 Civility, in contrast to the broad reach of 
professionalism, relates specifically to the “truth seeking process” through the 
adoption of a “just, dignified, courteous, and efficient manner.”37 At the heart 
of civility is found the rejection of hostility, combativeness, rude comportment, 
and degrading behavior.38 In their place, advocates of civility insist on the role 
32 Grenardo, supra note 31, at 245–46 (“Civility and professionalism are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the legal profession. Similarly, civility is also sometimes considered 
‘an element or characteristic of professionalism.’ Civility and ethics can overlap as well” 
(citations omitted)); Richard, supra note 31, at 17–19 (arguing that professionalism 
is inclusive of ethics and civility but that satisfaction of the standards of ethics and 
civility does not include the standards of professionalism); N. Lee Cooper & Stephen 
F. Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image and the Scope of Professionalism, 26 
Cumb. L. Rev. 923, 924–25 (1995/96) (noting reform efforts under the headings of ethics, 
professionalism, and civility and calling for “broader” definitions and “a more expansive 
and less compartmentalized discussion” of the standards that ought to guide the practice 
of law). Disagreement exists over the precise contours of their respective subject areas. 
Douglas S. Lang, Professionalism: Core Values: Can Courts Require Civil Conduct?, 78 
Tex. B. J. 718, 718 (2015) (chronicling current Texas and national debate on boundaries 
and resulting respective governing authority on ethics, professionalism, and civility); see 
also Grenardo, supra note 31, at 244–47; Richard, supra note 31, at 17–19.
33 Grenardo, supra note 31, at 246. 
34 Michael Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of American Legal 
Ethics, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 571, 620–24 (2014). Hence the rules of ethics, today embodied in 
the state-specific rules of professional conduct, have been viewed by many as providing 
only “minimum standards that lawyers must follow.” Richard, supra note 31, at 18; see 
also Cooper & Humphreys, supra note 32, at 929–30 (“These efforts to streamline the 
professional code of ethics from moral generalizations into more specific guidelines, 
important as they may be, cannot stand alone. Otherwise they can have the unintended 
consequence of narrowing the scope of ethical consideration and diminishing the 
urgency of our remaining ethical mandate”).
35 Richard, supra note 31, at 18 (emphasis added); see also Lang, supra note 32, at 718. In 
the lofty view of advocates for professionalism, the “attorney who embraces the ideals 
of professionalism meets or exceeds aspirational ideals established by common sense 
and common courtesies.” Richard, supra note 31, at 18; but see Gaetke, supra note 8, at 
699 (noting the lack of agreement over the meaning of “professionalism” and offering 
diverging definitions). 
36 Richard, supra note 31, at 18–19.
37 Grenardo, supra note 31, at 251; but see Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism in the Practice 
of Law: A Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism as 
Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 657, 681 (1994) 
(arguing that the civility codes embody the “escapism and conservatism of the normative 
vision” of class hierarchy).
38 Grenardo, supra note 31, at 244–45; Jonathan J. Lerner, Putting the Civil Back in Civil 
Litigation, N.Y. St. B.A. J. 33, 35–36 (2009).
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of respect, courtesy, and sometimes even kindness in the daily conduct of the 
practice of law.39 
Despite the efforts at improvement illustrated by this history of near-constant 
standard scrutiny and rule writing, the bar continues to struggle to maintain ethical, 
professional, and civil standards of behavior.40 The question of whether attorney 
behavior has actually deteriorated (or increased in its rate of deterioration) sparks 
much debate, but it is certainly true that attorneys have a long record of believing 
that their standards are in decline.41 Today’s increasingly large, mobile, and diverse 
bar,42 although emphatically to be celebrated in many respects, has brought with 
it the end to a relatively homogenous, close-knit bar that shared informal norms 
with little effort.43 Lack of implicitly shared informal norms may well account for a 
39 Grenardo, supra note 31, at 244–45; but see Cramer, Drake, & Diggins, supra note 8, 
at 471 (noting the difficulty of defining “civility”); Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your 
Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility as an Obligation of Professional 
Responsibility, 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 99, 107–9 (2012) (noting the distinctiveness of 
individual state civility codes while arguing that they are unified by ten core concepts of 
civility).
40 Kolinsky, supra note 8, at 115 (noting the divergence between how attorneys can and 
should behave); Bronson D. Bills, To Be or Not to Be: Civility and the Young Lawyer, 5 
Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 31, 32–33 (2005) (listing an array of improper behavior, including 
foul and profane language, “Rambo” tactics, name calling, and belligerent behavior); 
Hon. Marvin E. Aspen, Litigation Ethics and Professionalism Symposium: A Response 
to the Civility Naysayers, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 253, 253–55 (1998) (listing justices, 
judges, and attorney surveys observing deterioration in the civility of the bar); Daicoff, 
supra note 11, at 549 (listing as evidence of a decline in professionalism the increase 
in complaints against attorneys, lowered public opinion of attorneys, and decreased 
attorney satisfaction with the practice of law); Gee & Garner, supra note 9, at 178 
(exploring why “courtesy and restraint in personal conduct toward others . . . strike many 
observers today as almost laughable when one is speaking of the bar”); Aaronson, supra 
note 9, at 114 (confirming recent observation of the systemic lack of civility in the bar).
41 Pearce, supra note 26, at 249–50 (dating the debate over the role of ethics in practice 
to the mid-nineteenth century); Robert Hornstein, The Role and Value of a Shadow 
Program in the Law School Curriculum, 31 Miss. C. L. Rev. 405, 405–11 (2013) 
(dating the debate over legal education, including professional values, to the 1930s); 
Gaetke, supra note 8, at 694 (arguing that the bar has engaged in 100 years of periodic 
efforts to improve attorney conduct). Even scholars finding distinctive qualities in the 
contemporary developments faced by the bar admit that the question of the actual decline 
in attorney behavior is subject to debate. Daicoff, supra note 11, at 547; Sarat, supra note 
10, at 809–10 (1998); Campbell, supra note 39, at 103.
42 Gee & Garner, supra note 9, at 181–82 (noting the increased size and mobility of the bar 
and observing that a “related source of the incivility problem . . . is the downside of what 
most of us probably view as a salutary civic development: the opening of the profession 
to all social and economic classes”); Aaronson, supra note 9, at 121 (arguing that it 
has been convincingly demonstrated that “whether under the community reputation 
based reviews of much of the nineteenth century or the formalized character screening 
procedures of the last 100 to 115 years, the main impact of character fitness requirements 
within the American bar has been the exclusion of women, racial and religious minorities, 
and political dissenters”). 
43 Pearce, supra note 26, at 260, 270–72 (underscoring the assumption of shared norms 
in informal nineteenth-century American legal ethics and noting the difficulty of 
maintaining such norms with a larger, more mobile, and more diverse bar).
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related change in legal culture: the decline of the “lawyer-statesman” ideal in favor 
of the promotion of a rather narrowly understood self-interest.44 
But scholars focused on the longstanding nature of ethics concerns have 
pointed to more fundamental, centuries-old tensions within the practice of law in 
the adversarial system, a system that limits—but also requires—advocacy on behalf 
of litigants.45 Arising from the very nature of an adversary system, an enduring 
source of conflict over attorney ethics hovers over the potential for conflict between 
an attorney’s duty of client loyalty and zealous representation and an attorney’s 
duty to the common good.46 Indeed, this underlying tension in the identity of the 
attorney as advocate and as officer of the court predates the establishment of the 
American legal system.47
The term “common good,” chosen above as a kind of generic placeholder, 
may be understood to entail any or all of a set of professional and personal duties 
that can be in competition (or seeming competition) with the interests of a client. 
They can include, for example, the judiciary, justice, and personal integrity. Indeed, 
duties owed to the court generally have placed a limit on some duties, like zealous 
advocacy, owed to the client.48 Given the tension that lies between these two sets of 
duties, it is not surprising that zealous advocacy is often blamed for the failure to 
follow informal norms.49 Similarly, some scholars point to a more profound tension 
between an attorney’s duties to a client and the attorney’s moral well-being, arguing 
that loyalty to the client either destroys or is perceived to destroy an attorney’s 
ability to follow any preexisting personal moral compass.50 Yet critique of zealous 
advocacy and client loyalty is far from unanimous: others argue that ultimately 
these duties serve the interests of justice51 and that any unhealthy incentives are 
44 Daicoff, supra note 11, at 560–61; see also Benjamin V. Madison, III & Larry O. Natt 
Grant, II, Methods of Teaching and Forming Professional Identity: The Emperor Has 
No Clothes, But Does Anyone Really Care? How Law Schools Are Failing to Develop 
Students’ Professional Identity and Practical Judgment, 27 Regent U. L. Rev. 339, 342 
(2014/15) (arguing that contemporary law schools are failing to develop professional 
ethical identity). 
45 Russell G. Pearce, supra note 26, at 261–67 (1992); Andrews, supra note 26, at 435–37.
46 Gaetke, supra note 8, at 695 (“Thoughtful commentators pointedly assert that lawyers 
tend to act unethically by pursuing their clients’ objectives too single-mindedly, without 
concern for the negative impact of these efforts on other interests, including those of 
adversaries, third persons, the judicial system, and society”); Pearce, supra note 26, at 
249–50; Andrews, supra note 26, at 435–37.
47 Andrews, supra note 26, at 435.
48 Id. at 435–38.
49 Id.; Gaetke, supra note 8, at 718–720; Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The 
“z” Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 
S.C. L. Rev. 549, 568–69 (2002); see also Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients 
with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 Fla. St. 
U.L. Rev. 25 (2011) (arguing that the duty of zealous advocacy encourages attorneys to 
damage even their client’s own interests).
50 Daicoff, supra note 11, at 561–63; Andrew L. Reisman, Comment, An Essay on the 
Dilemma of “Honest Abe”: The Modern Day Professional Responsibility Implications 
of Abraham Lincoln’s Representations of Clients He Believed to Be Culpable, 72 Neb. L. 
Rev. 1205, 1226–28 (1993).
51 Pearce, supra note 26, at 256–57. 
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curbed by the importance of reputation within the legal community.52
Whatever the root cause of the behavior problems, scholars have united in arguing 
that failures in attorney comportment threaten the bar’s ability to fulfill its social 
and political function—the facilitation of peaceful, just dispute resolution. Rational 
deliberation is at the heart of law, and rational deliberation requires the moderate, civil 
use of language.53 More than merely manners, attorney behavior bears on the legal 
system’s ability—through the discernment of the judge and often through negotiation 
between the parties—to find the facts and properly apply the law thereto.54 When 
attorneys flout the norms of civil, professional, and ethical decision-making that 
govern (formally or informally) the practice, they contribute to conflict rather than 
to the resolution of conflict.55 Such behavior obscures justice in an individual case 
and undermines the perception of justice within the judiciary as a whole,56 arguably 
discouraging the use of the legal system for the resolution of myriad social problems. 
In this regard, ethics and civility work hand in hand, for how attorneys speak and write 
is inextricably bound to how and whether they fulfill their ethical duties—and thereby 
to the merit of the profession within both the society and the polity.57 
In the argument that follows, “ethics” will be employed in its broadest sense 
to include both the enforceable ethics rules and the aspirational norms (sometimes 
articulated in rules of professionalism and civility, sometimes left implicit and 
expressed through the opinions and behavior of members of bench and bar) that 
regulate the practice. The thesis of this article is that the rhetoric of Atticus Finch 
provides an example that meets our expectations for an ethical attorney. Moreover, 
because of his particular circumstances, he reveals how the seeming tensions or 
conflicts among attorney duties can be reconciled through the use of a particular 
way of employing speech—Attic rhetoric. Also through his Attic rhetoric, his 
character’s performance as an attorney underscores the value of civility to the 
judiciary and to the ability of the judiciary to play its role within our polity. 
Before arguing how to become like Atticus, however, I must make the case 
for why one might wish to do so. Part II, therefore, argues that Atticus is indeed 
an emulation-worthy example of ethical attorney conduct. To be more specific, his 
example shows that it is possible to overcome the tensions and temptations that 
may cause lesser attorneys to succumb to uncivil, unethical behavior. 
II. Atticus Finch as a Role Model 
The preamble of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct sets forth the three primary identities of an attorney: advocate, officer 
of the court, and citizen. The preamble then indicates—albeit in germ form—the 
potential for conflict between duties to client, to court, to society, and also to self—
the same conflicts that scholars point to as the source of tension in attorney duties. 
52 Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and 
Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 512 (1994).
53 Aaronson, supra note 9, at 116–18. 
54 Harris, supra note 49, at 574–78. 
55 Cramer, Drake & Diggins, supra note 8, at 467.
56 Campbell, supra note 39, at 106.
57 Gee & Garner, supra note 9, at 188–90. 
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The preamble thus provides a standard that is both generally accepted and sensitive 
to the potential for ethical tensions. 
According to the preamble an American attorney is and should be “[1] a 
representative of clients, [2] an officer of the legal system and [3] a public citizen 
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”58 The preamble then 
elaborates on each of these aspects of attorney identity before underscoring the 
role of conscience and addressing the potential for conflict among duties.59 In To 
Kill a Mockingbird Atticus, as described by the narrator—his young daughter 
Scout—fulfills all three aspects of attorney identity. More to the point, he does 
so under circumstances that require extraordinary rhetorical skill to avoid the 
potential for conflict among the duties inherent in each aspect of his identity. In so 
doing, he follows his conscience while providing an excellent role model of ethical, 
professional, and—most particularly—civil attorney conduct. 
A. Representative of Clients
According to the preamble, as a representative of clients, an attorney has two 
functions: an attorney (1) “zealously asserts a client’s position under the rules of 
the adversary system” and (2) serves as an advisor counseling a client about legal 
rights and “their practical implications.”60 Atticus is more often shown in the first of 
these functions, zealously advocating for his client as the court-appointed defense 
attorney for Tom Robinson—a poor African American man accused of raping a 
poor white woman.61 Atticus’s zealous advocacy for his client is evident in his 
comments as he prepares for trial and during Tom’s trial. Atticus appears in his role 
as advisor later and more briefly in the novel when he advises his client after the 
guilty verdict and through his ruminations after Tom’s death.
From the start Atticus evinces the intent to live up to the zealous advocacy 
standard by doing everything legally permissible for a client who faces dishonest 
accusers and a stubbornly prejudiced jury.62 When questioned by his daughter 
about his determination to defend Tom, Atticus explains that retaining his self-
respect required accepting the appointment.63 Later he tells his brother that he will 
do his utmost to shake the jury out of their prejudices but that his more realistic 
hopes are pinned on the appeal.64 Knowing that a guilty verdict is a near certainty 
58 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 1. 
59 Id. at pmbl.
60 Id. at pmbl. ¶ 2. 
61 Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird, 100, 117, 223–24, 230–34 (Mass Paperback ed., 
Grand Central Publishing, 1982) (1960). 
62 Elizabeth Keyes remarks that Atticus’s example of zealous advocacy motivates “anyone 
who ever wanted to become a lawyer while reading To Kill a Mockingbird.” Zealous 
Advocacy: Pushing Against the Borders in Immigration Litigation, 45 Seton Hall L. 
Rev. 475, 475 (2015).
63 Lee, supra note 61, at 100–101. Jonathan A. Rapping concludes that, while there is nothing 
to indicate that Atticus sought Tom’s case, there is no support for the conclusion that 
“Atticus was reticent to take on the representation,” supra note 4, at 855. Implicit in Atticus’s 
explanation to his daughter of his defense of Tom is the fact that Atticus (like other Maycomb 
attorneys) has defended other African American clients. Lee, supra note 61, at 99–100. 
64 Lee, supra note 61, at 117 (“Before I’m through, I intend to jar the jury a bit—I think 
we’ll have a reasonable chance on appeal, though”). Later, Atticus explains his position 
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because of the ingrained racism and inflamed passions of his town, Atticus obtains 
a postponement in the hopes that the town’s initial outrage will subside and permit 
a more rational mindset by the time of trial.65 Atticus thus asserts the right of his 
client to the most favorable trial that the rules of the adversary system permit, all 
the while keeping his sights on the appeal stage—when he knows Tom will be most 
likely to prevail.66 This is zealous advocacy.
Atticus maintains this zeal in the face of high personal costs and a distaste 
for the type of litigation that Tom’s defense entails. Much less does this case 
offer Atticus a particular legal or intellectual appeal to counterbalance its obvious 
downsides: since his very first case ended with the execution of his clients, he 
has suffered from a “profound distaste” for criminal law.67 The postponement that 
Atticus obtains to protect his client’s interest will certainly multiply the financial 
and emotional costs born by Atticus and his family. In the midst of the Great 
Depression, Atticus is paid in firewood and nuts by some of his clients.68 Cash poor 
already,69 the financial impact of zealously defending such a popularly hated client 
must increase with the lengthening of the period before trial.70 Atticus has a group 
of core friends who support his resolution, but this defense will likely alienate 
potential clients.71 Apart from the financial implications, over the course of the 
months leading up to trial, his children are taunted at school, and he is faced with 
the difficult task of explaining to them why their neighbors and fellow citizens call 
them names and hate their father.72 He must explain to Scout that “there’s been 
some high talk around town to the effect that I shouldn’t do much about defending 
this man.”73 He instructs her in full knowledge that the day’s incident at school 
will be the first among many: “You might hear some ugly talk about it at school, 
but do one thing for me if you will: you just hold your head high and keep those 
fists down.”74 In truth, Atticus and his children also face derision and resistance 
from citizens on the streets and from within their own family.75 In the midst of this 
turmoil, Atticus seems most deeply concerned about the impact on the emotional 
well-being and moral development of his children.76 Although he is sensitive to the 
to those outside the family circle when a fellow citizen asks him, “Don’t see why you 
touched it in the first place ... you’ve got everything to lose from this, Atticus. I mean 
everything.” Id. at 195. Atticus retorts, “Link, that boy might go to the chair, but he’s not 
going till the truth’s told ... . And you know what the truth is.” Id.
65 Id. at 100–101, 117, 194.
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 5.
68 Id. at 26–28.
69 Some of Atticus’s clients are rural farmers with no cash because of the Great Depression. 
Therefore Atticus, like other professionals in town, is also “cash poor.” Id.
70 His sister, Alexandra, and his friend, Miss Maudie Atkinson, discuss how other 
professionals who agree with Atticus will not take public steps similar to his for fear of 
losing the business of those who disagree. Id. at 316.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 99–101.
73 Id. at 100.
74 Id. at 101.
75 Id. at 110, 139, 180, 195.
76 Id. at 116–119. Atticus confides his fears about the impact on his children to his brother 
Jack: “I hope and pray I can get Jem and Scout through it without bitterness, and most 
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price that his children are paying for Tom’s zealous defense, he shows no signs of 
wavering in his determination. 
When Tom’s trial commences, Atticus continues to make evident that he is 
not merely going through the motions of providing legal representation. To identify 
Atticus’s zeal at trial, one must distinguish between volume and effectiveness. 
Although Atticus retains his calm and courteous manner, his daughter—who 
has frequently observed him in the courtroom—recognizes the indications of his 
zeal operating within his characteristic self-control. Two stages of the trial bear 
particularly clear signs of Atticus’s zeal: his cross-examination of the alleged rape 
victim, Mayella Ewell, and his closing statement. 
During his cross-examination of Mayella, Atticus persists (despite his own, 
more delicate inclinations) in revealing the witness’s dishonesty.77 He questions 
Mayella thoroughly, effectively, and calmly, although it is equally evident that he 
finds this particular aspect of the trial nearly sickening.78 Nonetheless, he persists: 
“Atticus reached up and took off his glasses, turned his good right eye to the 
witness, and rained questions on her.”79 By the time he finishes questioning her, 
Atticus “looked like his stomach hurt.”80 Scout, in her youthful innocence, can only 
conclude that somehow “Atticus had hit her hard in a way that was not clear to me, 
but it gave him no pleasure to do so.”81 
During her father’s closing arguments, Scout discerns how the gravity of his 
client’s situation has propelled Atticus to appeal, still calmly, but profoundly to the 
fellow citizens who have prejudged his client: she describes him standing as if “stark 
naked,” his “voice having lost its aridity, its detachment, and he was talking to the 
jury as if they were folks on the post office corner.”82 The initial impression created 
by this description of Atticus’s courtroom zeal is confirmed when she reports that, 
after closing and turning away from the jury, Atticus mouths to himself, “In the 
name of God, believe [Tom].”83 
of all, without catching Maycomb’s usual disease. Why reasonable people go stark 
raving mad when anything involving a Negro comes up, is something I don’t pretend to 
understand. . . . I just hope that Jem and Scout come to me for their answers instead of 
listening to the town. I hope they trust me enough.”
77 Id. at 242–51.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 250.
80 Id. at 251.
81 Id. at 252. Some have argued, on the contrary, that Atticus intentionally disgraces 
Mayella or that his compassion for her is feigned. Lubet, supra note 4, at 1361 (1999); 
Teresa Godwin Phelps, The Margins of Maycomb: A Rereading of To Kill a Mockingbird, 
45 Ala. L. Rev. 511, 524–26 (1994). Others find that Atticus does his duty with distaste 
and that he treats her with as much compassion as possible consistent with his client’s 
position. Ann Althouse, Classics Revisited: Reconstructing Atticus Finch? A Response 
to Professor Lubet, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1363, 1365–66 (1999); Randolph N. Stone, Atticus 
Finch, in Context, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1378, 1378–79 (1999); Thomas L. Shaffer, Growing 
Up Good in Maycomb, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 531, 548 (1994). Atticus’s personal sympathy for 
Mayella is supported later in the novel. When insulted and spat upon by Mayella’s father 
(her probable rapist and chronic physical abuser) he remains passive: “If spitting in my 
face and threatening me saved Mayella Ewell one extra beating, that’s something I’ll 
gladly take. He had to take it out on somebody and I’d rather it be me than that houseful 
of children out there.” Lee, supra note 61, at 290–93.
82 Lee, supra note 61, at 271.
83 Id. at 275.
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Despite his zeal, the predictable verdict arrives after only a few hours’ 
deliberation.84 The trial now lost despite Atticus’s efforts, the novel shows Atticus 
as an advisor fulfilling his duty to inform his client of his rights and their practical 
implications. As he must to preserve his client’s rights and autonomy, Atticus 
advises Tom that his chances will improve on appeal, but he makes no promises.85 
His client’s despair must tempt Atticus to promise more, but Atticus counsels 
his client as his duties require—honestly.86 Accordingly, before Tom leaves the 
courtroom, Atticus can provide only qualified hope.87 
Knowing that the success of his appeal is uncertain, Tom is soon killed while 
attempting to escape from prison.88 Atticus, reeling in response to this news, 
remembers but does not second-guess his decision to provide an honest assessment 
to his client: “‘We had such a good chance,’ he said. ‘I told him what I thought, but 
I couldn’t in truth say that we had more than a good chance. I guess Tom was tired 
of white men’s chances and preferred to take his own.’”89 Tom’s fate illustrates 
the high cost of honesty with a despairing client and highlights one reason why 
fulfilling this duty can be difficult for a well-intentioned attorney who genuinely 
wishes to protect a client. Despite the outcome in this instance, it is important to 
remember that Atticus’s determination to counsel his client honestly reveals respect 
for Tom; rather than withhold information from his client (which would effectively 
treat him as a child), Atticus gave his client information with which to make his 
own decisions. Another way of stating this: Atticus, having lost after zealously 
asserting Tom’s position under the trial rules, honestly advised Tom of his right to 
an appeal and its likely practical implications. 
B. Officer of the Court
As an officer of the court, conformity to the law is requisite in all facets of an 
attorney’s life: legal, professional, and personal.90 The preamble indicates that as an 
officer of the court an attorney ought to “demonstrate respect for the legal system and 
for those who serve it.”91 Hence, while an attorney may have the duty to challenge 
“official action,” there is simultaneously a duty to “uphold legal process.”92 
Atticus, an attorney whose client will not prevail despite the justice of his 
defense, is the most sympathetic of attorneys when it comes to the difficulty of 
fulfilling the function of an officer of the court. His client’s cause is just, but his 
client will lose the trial and very likely his life. What greater temptation exists for 
overstepping the bounds of the law and of respect for the law? Nonetheless, Atticus 
expresses the utmost respect for the court and the judge. Yet he does not gloss over 
the injustice dealt his client. Rather than make either of these opposing mistakes, 
Atticus’s speech—in and out of the courtroom—analytically identifies the source 
84 Id. at 281–82.
85 Id. at 313–15.
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 282.
88 Id. at 314–15. 
89 Id. at 315.
90 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 5. 
91 Id.
92 Id.
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and even the dire degree of injustice while affirming the strengths of the judiciary 
that do deserve respect. 
Atticus demonstrates respect for the judge and upholds process in the 
courtroom through his eminently civil bearing and speech. Unlike the prosecutor—
who uses acrimony in an attempt to sway—Atticus proceeds steadily, inflecting 
little emotion and no acrimony into his voice: “So far, things were utterly dull: 
nobody had thundered, there were no arguments between opposing counsel, there 
was no drama.”93 Atticus proceeds through the trial “amiably,” using language no 
more complex or challenging than what Scout hears from him during daily life.94 
Far from working the jury into an emotional turmoil, he behaves as if he were in the 
midst of a real-estate dispute and uses “his infinite capacity for calming turbulent 
seas” to “make a rape case as dry as a sermon.”95 His manner is alternately casual, 
genial, mild, gentle, and detached.96 Comments from both Scout and the judge 
indicate that this is how Atticus generally carries himself in court.97 
Yet Atticus is not complacent. In his closing, he educates the jury about the 
critical nature of their role in the workings of the justice system. Supporting legal 
process (both Tom’s trial and the jury’s more general respect for the judiciary) 
without flinching in the face of the jury’s greatest weakness (the individuals on 
whose integrity that process must rely) Atticus manages to simultaneously challenge 
the injustice about to occur and affirm the justice system within which it is about 
to occur. 
“I’m no idealist to believe firmly in the integrity of our courts and in the jury 
system—that is no ideal to me, it is a living, working reality. Gentlemen, a court 
is no better than each man of you sitting before me on this jury. A court is only as 
sound as its jury, and a jury is only as sound as the men who make it up.”98
Not only does Atticus show marked respect for the trial, the judge, and the 
witnesses, but when the verdict threatens his children’s respect for the legal system 
he teaches them to understand its flaws without scorning its underlying principles. 
When they first hear the verdict, Atticus concedes to his son, Jem, that Atticus 
does not understand how the jury could convict Tom: Atticus admits that “they’ve 
done it before and they did it tonight and they’ll do it again.”99 Then he reminds 
his son that the appeal may reach a different result.100 Days later, discussing the 
conviction again with his children, Atticus explores the death penalty, rape statutes, 
circumstantial evidence, and juries, showing his children that—while the law on 
any particular point may be debatable—the deeper problem is the prejudice that the 
jury brought with it into the legal system.101
93 Lee, supra note 61, at 226.
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 234–35, 245, 270. 
97 Id. at 229, 242–43.
98 Id. at 274. Claudia Durst Johnson concludes that Atticus is “grieved” that the jury will 
not live up to its intended role. Claudia Durst Johnson, To Kill a Mockingbird: 
Threatening Boundaries 95 (1994).
99 Lee, supra note 61, at 285.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 239–98.
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In addition to demonstrating respect for the judiciary and upholding legal 
process, being an “officer of the court” entails maintaining actual lawful behavior.102 
Atticus’s adherence to the law is not generally in question, but there is one scene in 
which he might be interpreted as failing to live up to this standard in his personal 
life. Near the conclusion of the novel, Mayella’s father, Bob Ewell, attacks and 
nearly kills Scout and her brother Jem.103 During the attack they are saved by their 
reclusive neighbor, Boo Radley.104 Discussing the incident and the investigation 
that will follow with Sheriff Tate, Atticus initially insists that he and Sheriff Tate 
must report what Atticus believes to be the truth—that Jem killed Bob Ewell in 
self defense.105 When Sheriff Tate states his intent to report that Bob Ewell fell on 
his knife, Atticus protests, “Nobody’s hushing this up. I don’t live that way.”106 As 
Atticus and Sheriff Tate debate, each man maintains his position.107 Atticus explains 
to Sheriff Tate, “I can’t live one way in town and another way in my home.”108 
Finally, however, Atticus defers.109 Has Atticus lied, just this once, to save his son 
from a criminal investigation? 
Atticus does not lie to save Jem. He agrees to the proposed deception (on his 
part a deception by silence) only after Sheriff Tate convinces him that it is Boo 
Radley—not Jem—who killed Bob Ewell and thus saved his children.110 Hence, his 
silence is motivated by the desire to protect his neighbor, not his son. Moreover, to 
fully convince him, the sheriff must also persuade the still-hesitant Atticus that an 
investigation would bring acute suffering to Boo Radley. Tate argues as follows:
“I never heard tell that it’s against the law for a citizen to do his 
utmost to prevent a crime from being committed, which is exactly 
what [Boo Radley] did, but maybe you’ll say it’s my duty to tell 
the town all about it and not hush it up. Know what’d happen then? 
All the ladies in Maycomb includin’ my wife’d be knocking on his 
door bringin’ angel food cakes. To my way of thinkin’, Mr. Finch, 
taking the one man who’s done you and this town a great service an’ 
draggin’ him with his shy ways into the limelight—to me, that’s a 
sin. It’s a sin and I’m not about to have it on my head.”111 
As the scene draws to a close, Lee has made clear that Atticus consents to silence 
for the sake of Boo Radley, the man who saved his children. Moreover, Lee has 
102 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 5. 
103 Lee, supra note 61, at 357.
104 Id. at 362.
105 Id. at 365.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 365–67.
108 Id. at 367.
109 Id. at 370.
110 Id. at 368–70; Shaffer, supra note 81, at 554 (supporting the interpretation that Atticus 
changes his position to protect Boo Radley rather than to protect his son); see also 
Thomas L. Shaffer, American Legal Ethics: Text, Readings, and Discussion 
Topics 14–15 (1985) (arguing that Atticus’s lie to protect Boo may be a moral mistake 
but concluding that Atticus’s approach to solving this moral dilemma shows him to be a 
hero because he takes right actions seriously). 
111 Lee, supra note 61, at 369–70.
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made equally clear that Sheriff Tate, the official who will investigate Bob Ewell’s 
death and come to his own conclusion, cannot be shaken by Atticus’s preference 
for honesty. As a practical matter, there is little that Atticus can accomplish, and 
his comportment as an officer of the court remains at least reasonable in its most 
questionable moment. 
C. Public Citizen Having Special Responsibility for the Quality of 
Justice, the Role of Conscience, and Resolving Potential Conflict 
among Duties
An attorney has duties as a public citizen with a special responsibility for the quality of 
justice: “As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to 
the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of services rendered by 
the legal profession.”112 As a public citizen a lawyer should also “cultivate knowledge 
of the law beyond its use for clients.”113 Clearly, Atticus works to improve the law and 
justice by serving in the state legislature114 and by defending a client who requires a 
court appointment for counsel.115 He fulfills the educational component of his duties 
by working to prevent his children from adopting the racism of the town and by 
setting a public example of defense of equal legal rights.116 
When one asks why Atticus takes on these duties as a public citizen, the 
following paragraph of the preamble provides a clear answer echoed by the novel: 
an attorney must be guided by conscience.117 The zealous defense of Tom costs 
Atticus a considerable price, not least of which is anxiety for his children and 
risk to their personal safety as they respond to the slurs, bullying, and stares in 
the schoolyard and in town.118 Scout asks her father why he defends Tom despite 
popular opinion, despite the fact that “most folks seem to think that they’re right 
and you’re wrong.”119 Atticus’s answer to his daughter twice refers to his conscience 
as the reason why he must proceed.
 “[I]t’s not fair to you and Jem, I know that, but sometimes we 
have to make the best of things, and the way we conduct ourselves 
when the chips are down—well, all I can say is, when you and Jem 
are grown, maybe you’ll look back on this with some compassion 
and some feeling that I didn’t let you down. This case, Tom 
Robinson’s case, is something that goes to the essence of a man’s 
conscience—Scout, I couldn’t go to church and worship God if I 
didn’t try to help that man.”120
112 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 6. 
113 Id. 
114 Lee, supra note 61, at 7, 100, 154–55, 171, 326. 
115 See supra Part II.a.
116 Lee, supra note 61, at 116–19, 293–98. 
117 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 6. 
118 Lee, supra note 61 at 110, 139, 180, 195. 
119 Id. at 139.
120 Id.
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“[B]efore I can live with other folks I’ve got to live with myself. 
The one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s 
conscience.”121 
As Atticus’s situation illustrates and the preamble concedes, “In the nature of law 
practice . . . conflicting responsibilities are encountered.”122 Or, in Atticus’s words, 
“simply by the nature of the work, every lawyer gets at least one case in his lifetime 
that affects him personally.”123 The preamble proceeds to describe what To Kill a 
Mockingbird shows: “Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflicts 
between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and to the 
lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory 
living.”124 For Atticus these conflicts are first evident in the tension between his role 
as zealous advocate for his client and his role as officer of a legal system that he 
knows will fail that client. 
But the potential for conflict among an attorney’s duties is even more profound 
than revealed by the rule’s reference to earning a satisfactory living: Atticus 
struggles to obey his conscience (which demands that he defend Tom zealously) 
without sacrificing the emotional wellbeing and safety of his children. Hence, 
without wavering from his decision to zealously defend Tom as his conscience 
dictates, Atticus suffers at the prospect of the potential damage to his children: he 
teaches them to deal with the playground bullies and snubbing neighbors,125 fears 
that they will contract the disease of racism plaguing their town,126 and clings to the 
belief that above all they need a father with integrity to survive the conflict whole.127
The tensions among Atticus’s duties are most acute, however, when he steps 
beyond the role of client representative and—as a public citizen—takes personal 
responsibility for Tom’s safety. Warned by Sheriff Tate of the potential for a lynch 
mob, Atticus sits and reads—apparently unarmed—in front of the jail.128 To fulfill 
his duty as a public citizen he puts his life between Tom and citizens bent on 
lynching.129 When the anticipated lynch mob comes forward, Atticus coolly faces 
it, willing and able to confront the would-be murderers with only his ability to use 
language as a defense.130 
But then Scout steps into the circle of menacing farmers, followed by Jem 
and their friend Dill, and Atticus’s face shows the “plain fear” that he had not 
beforehand displayed.131 Before his voice had remained unchanged; now Scout can 
see his hands tremble.132 With their lives hanging in the balance, Atticus exhibits 
fear; still, he stands commanding and then pleading his disobedient son to take 
121 Id. at 140.
122 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 9. 
123 Lee, supra note 61, at 101.
124 Model Rules, supra note 6, at pmbl. ¶ 9. 
125 Lee, supra note 61, at 99–102, 139–40.
126 Id. at 116–17, 295.
127 Id. at 366–68.
128 Id. at 201–02. 
129 Id.
130 Id. at 201–03.
131 Id. at 203.
132 Id. at 202–03.
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Scout home.133 Despite the terror he has now betrayed, Atticus shows no sign of 
leaving Tom defenseless for the sake of rescuing the children.134
Ultimately, the situation is diffused when Scout manages to strike up a 
conversation with one of the would-be lynchers.135 When the men leave, Atticus’s 
relieved body language betrays the turmoil of the moments before: he “had gone to 
the jail and was leaning against it with his face to the wall.”136 As he gathers himself 
to head home, Atticus produces “his handkerchief, [gives] his face a going-over and 
[blows] his nose violently.”137 In a more demonstrative man, these actions might be 
meaningless. For Atticus, these are the outward indications of a man who has just 
withstood the greatest trial of his life. 
Insofar as Atticus zealously represents his client and remains within legal 
bounds while demonstrating respect for the law under difficult circumstance (at 
considerable emotional and financial cost), he is a sound role model. Insofar as he 
does this while simultaneously speaking the truth about and attempting to repair the 
injustices within the system, he is that much more worthy a model. But his actions 
as the representative of his client and an officer of the court do not fully explain the 
degree of admiration rightly directed to Atticus. His fulfillment of the public-citizen 
aspect of attorney identity sets him apart from the crowd of potential examples. As 
a public citizen—not as a client representative or an officer of the court—Atticus 
risks the lives of his children to improve the quality of justice in Maycomb. 
All this, and he never once raises his voice. 
III. Cicero’s Commentary on Attic—and Therefore 
Atticus’s—Rhetoric
Lee’s naming of her hero indicates that one should focus on his rhetoric to 
understand how he is able to navigate tension so admirably. Attic rhetoric adheres 
to simple, rational, and restrained techniques, techniques that reveal the honesty 
and therefore the integrity of the speaker across venues, between audiences, and 
over time. After exploring Attic oratory more fully, it will be possible to trace its 
effectiveness for Atticus.
A. Defining Attic Rhetoric
Attic rhetoric is notable for its simplicity, its focus on reason and evidence rather 
than passion, and its adherence to the same word choice and expression regardless 
of audience. In sum, Attic rhetoric—named after the Attic Greeks but practiced 
by a minority of both Ancient Greek and Roman orators—eschews the arousal 
of the passions, favoring instead concise and controlled communication. David 
Hume’s Essays briefly describes Attic rhetoric, providing an introduction of its 
major features to the modern reader while indicating the most important ancient 
133 Id. at 203–04.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 203–06.
136 Id. at 206.
137 Id.
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figure—Cicero—to those seeking to learn more.138 According to Hume, Attic 
eloquence in rhetoric is “calm, elegant, and subtle.”139 Attic eloquence “instructed 
the reason more than affected the passions, and never raised its tone above argument 
or common discourse.”140 
Hume’s description should not be mistaken for praise: he critiques this style 
for failing to incorporate—when the audience or situation called for it—either the 
pathetic or the sublime.141 In contrast to the Attic orators, Hume praises Cicero’s 
and Demosthenes’s command over the passions and thus the resolutions of their 
audiences.142 Hume himself waxes poetic on the vigor of these ancient orators.
With what a blaze of eloquence must such a sentence be 
surrounded to give it grace, or cause it to make any impression on 
the hearers? And what noble art and sublime talents are requisite 
to arrive, by just degrees, at a sentiment so bold and excessive: To 
inflame the audience, so as to make them accompany the speaker 
in such violent passions, and such elevated conceptions: And to 
conceal, under a torrent of eloquence, the artifice, by which all 
this is effectuated!143
These ancient paragons created “vehemence of thought,” in part, by accompanying 
their passionate appeals with violent gestures, including stomping their feet.144 
Hume argues that Cicero’s rhetoric had more command over the “resolution” of 
his audience because, “on proper occasions,” he would invoke the pathetic and the 
sublime.145 
 Taking a cue from Hume, one finds in Cicero’s prolific writings a wealth 
of elaboration on the features and importance of Attic rhetoric.146 Cicero wrote 
on this subject to distinguish and defend his own more passionate and elaborate 
rhetoric relative to the Attic rhetoric of his day.147 Calling themselves the Attici, 
138 Dᴀᴠɪᴅ Hᴜᴍᴇ, Essᴀʏs: Mᴏʀᴀʟ, Pᴏʟɪᴛɪᴄᴀʟ, ᴀɴᴅ Lɪᴛᴇʀᴀʀʏ 108 (Liberty Fund ed., Liberty 
Fund Books 1985) (1777).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 99–101, 106. 
143 Id. at 101. 
144 Id.
145 Id. at 108. 
146 Cicero was a Roman philosopher, orator (and sometimes litigator), and politician in the 
first century B.C. Rex Stem, Cicero as Orator and Philosopher: The Value of the Pro 
Murena for Ciceronian Political Thought, 68 Rev. Pol. 206, 206–8 (2006) (providing 
a brief sketch of Cicero’s multifaceted pursuits); Gesine Manuwald, The Speeches to 
the People in Cicero’s Oratorical Corpora, 30 Rhetorica: J. Hist. Rhetoric 153 
(2012) (providing an overview of some of Cicero’s oratorical involvement in Roman 
politics). For a more detailed, broader biography, see Catherine Steel, Introduction, in 
The Cambridge Companion to Cicero 1–6 (Catherine Steel ed., 2013).
147 Cecil W. Wooten, Cicero and the Quintilian on the Style of Demosthenes, 15 Rhetorica: 
J. Hist. Rhetoric 177, 178 (1997); Eric Laughton, Cicero and the Greek Orators, 82 
Am. J. Philology 27, 29–31 (1961); Erich S. Gruen, Cicero and Licinius Calvus, 71 
Harv. Stud. Classical Philology 215, 226 (1967); Sean Gurd, Cicero and Editorial 
Revision, 26 Classical Antiquity 49, 59–60 (2007).
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Cicero’s stylistic critics had adopted a “plain and lucid style with a minimum 
of rhetorical ornament, a studied neglect of rhythm, and an infrequent use of 
emotional appeal.”148 Their number included prominent orators of the day, among 
them Brutus and Calvus.149 Modeling and naming themselves after great speakers 
of the Attic period in ancient Greece, the Attici understood the orator to be a type of 
instructor.150 Therefore, rather than refining the art of persuasion above all else, they 
considered themselves focused on logic.151 Their Greek models included Lysias, 
Thucydides, and Xenophon.152
Cicero responded to the Attici by pointing to the superlative example of 
Demosthenes—a Greek of the Attic period with whom Cicero’s rhetorical style 
was more consistent.153 Cicero’s recurring use of Demosthenes as a counterexample 
to the Attic style reveals a complicating factor in the debate between Cicero and 
the Attici: the term “Attic” refers to both a period of time in a specific place (Attic 
Greece) and to a specific school of rhetoric.154 Hence, the passionate and elaborate 
Demosthenes, for example, was most definitely an Attic Greek but not an Attic 
orator; by the same logic, the Roman Attici (like Brutus) were Attic orators but not 
Attic Greeks.155
Looking past complications in nomenclature, the debate between Cicero and 
the Attici produced something most useful to the modern scholar: a reason for 
Cicero to dwell on the distinctions between Attic rhetoric and his own style (and 
that of Demosthenes). In sum, Cicero’s aggregate portrait of Attic rhetoric has three 
key features: (1) a spare, simple word choice, (2) a preference for restrained, even-
toned, logical argument over elaborate, passionate appeal, and (3) a uniformity in 
style regardless of topic, audience, or occasion. 
148 Jeffrey Henderson, Introduction, in Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ: Bʀᴜᴛᴜs, Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀ 297, 297–98 (Loeb Ed., 
Jeffrey Henderson ed., G. L. Hendrickson & H. M. Hubbell trans., 1962) (46 B.C.).
149 Laughton, supra note 147, at 29–31 (1961); Gurd, supra note 147, at 58–62; Gruen, 
supra note 147, at 226.
150 Henderson, supra note 148, at 297–98. 
151 Id.
152 Id.; Wooten, , note 147, at 178; Laughton, supra note 147, at 29–31. 
153 Henderson, supra note 148, at 297–98. There is some disagreement over whether Cicero 
genuinely modeled his oratory after Demosthenes or perhaps merely found this iconic 
Attic a useful figure in his debate with the Roman Attici. Wooten, supra note 147, at 
178, 181 (arguing that Cicero used his portrayal of Demosthenes, which may have 
been inaccurate, as a vehicle for defending his own techniques); Laughton, supra note 
147, at 35 (supporting Cicero’s genuine admiration of Demosthenes). Cicero wrote of 
Demosthenes in Orator, “Among orators, certainly among Greek orators, it is amazing 
how one man has pre-eminence over all.” Cicero, Orator in Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ: Bʀᴜᴛᴜs, Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀ 
297, ii.6 (Loeb Ed., Jeffrey Hendrickson ed., G. L. Hendrickson & H. M. Hubbell trans., 
1962) (46 B.C.).
154 Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ IV.7-15 (Loeb ed., Jeffrey Henderson ed., H. M 
Hubbell trans., 1949) (90 B.C.). 
155 Id. Pointing to Attic orators who did not use what the Roman Attici called an Attic style 
(like Demosthenes), Cicero argued that the Attici had inappropriately co-opted the title 
for their specific method. While still insisting that Demosthenes could only be classed 
as Attic because of his period and origin, Cicero also often refers to the plain, simple 
style as Attic. This adds an unavoidable layer of complexity to understanding Cicero’s 
descriptions of the various styles of rhetoric. 
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1. Simple, Accurate Word Choice
In his Tusculan Disputations and in De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Cicero described 
Attic rhetoric as spare, simple—eschewing anything grand or ornate.156 By 
comparison to his own oratory prowess, Cicero considered Attic orators to “prefer 
their own poverty stricken bareness to rich luxuriance.”157 Lysias, for example, used 
great simplicity and therefore “seems excessively meager.”158 Unlike Demosthenes, 
it is unclear whether Lysias could speak “with great passion” even when a situation 
called for it.159 The Attici admired Lysias’s choice of words as the “perfect model,” 
but Cicero heard instead “old fashioned plainness.”160 The Attic style thus makes 
“intelligence consist in fastidiousness of taste in oratory and take[s] no pleasure in 
anything lofty and magnificent.”161 
Notwithstanding its rejection of anything grand and ornate, however, there 
is “refinement” in the “plain” Attic style.162 Cicero concedes, for example, that 
Lysias can justly be admired for his “correctness and purity of diction.”163 Although 
“meager” or “lean,” Lysias’s speech also wields a kind of “muscular strength.”164 
The Attic orator thus achieves a limited degree of success: “Those who have 
attained only to this may be considered sound and spare as far as that goes, but 
may be compared to athletes who are fit to promenade in the gymnasium, but not 
to seek the prize at Olympia.”165 Moreover, through their relatively simple use of 
words, Attic orators avoided the potential pitfalls associated with using grand style 
and ornate speech poorly—Attic orators do not risk “inappropriate, harsh, and 
far-fetched” effect.166 In other words, better to be a solid Attic speaker than to 
attempt without the requisite skill to be Cicero or Demosthenes.
Nonetheless, Cicero’s critique of the minimalism of Attic speech is firm. 
Continuing the athletic analogy, he argues that the “prize-winners, though free from 
all diseases, are not content with mere good health, but seek strength, muscles, 
blood, and even as it were an attractive tan.”167 More than a matter of taste, Cicero 
embraces a richer approach to language as the more effective and therefore more 
practical method of persuasion.168 In terms of the application of his conclusions to 
156 Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Tᴜsᴄᴜʟᴀɴ Dɪsᴘᴜᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴs II.i.2–4 (Loeb Ed., Jeffrey Henderson ed., J. E. King 
trans., 1945) (45 B.C.); Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ, supra note 154, at III.7–8. 
157 Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Tᴜsᴄᴜʟᴀɴ Dɪsᴘᴜᴛᴀᴛɪᴏɴs, supra note 156, at  II.i.2–4. 
158 Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ, supra note 154, at III.7–8.
159 Id.
160 Laughton, supra note 147 at 30. 
161 Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ, supra note 154, at III.12.
162 Id.
163 Laughton, supra note 147, at 31. Cicero appears to have formed a similarly qualified 
positive opinion of one of the leading Roman Attici, Calvus: according to Cicero, Calvus’s 
choice of style limited his power to reach all except the most learned of audiences, but 
Cicero gave him credit for learning and discrimination. Gruen, supra note 147, at 226.
164 Laughton, supra note 147, at 31. 
165 Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ, supra note 154, at III.12.
166 Id. at III.7–8.
167 Id. at III.8.
168 Andrew M. Riggsby, Pliny on Cicero and Oratory: Self Fashioning in the Public Eye, 
116 Am. J. Philology 123, 128 (1995); Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ, supra 
note 154, at III.7–8. 
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contemporary speech, it is important to note that Cicero’s opinions are premised 
on the “middlebrow” needs of a speaker in a republican context.169 According 
to Cicero’s observations of political life, Attic reserve simply does not generate 
sufficient power in a democracy; instead, adroit technique must be employed 
because “republican government plays itself out in a popular theatre designed for 
broad effects and capable of, at best, middlebrow artistry.”170 
2. Logical Argument, Not Passionate Appeal
Cicero’s Orator and Brutus reveal a second purported deficiency in Attic rhetoric: 
a lack of passionate appeal. Rather than appealing directly to the passions, Attic 
rhetoric is refined and scrupulous.171 Speaking in a restrained tone,172 an Attic orator 
has no need for strong lungs.173 Avoiding rhythm altogether, instead the Attic orator’s 
speech has “something agreeable about it and show[s] a not unpleasant carelessness 
on the part of a man who is paying more attention to thought than to words.”174 
Words flow in a manner that is “loose but not rambling; so that it may seem to move 
freely but not to wander without restraint.”175 At times the result may be “rough and 
unpolished,” but the good Attic speaker remains “precise and discriminating.”176 In 
essence, the Attic orator appeals to the reason without distracting the audience from 
the content of a speech. 
Cicero admitted that the restrained Attic style had its own charm. Indeed, 
because of its simplicity, even those who cannot employ it effectively will have 
the impression that they can imitate the Attic style with success.177 Imitation of 
the precision, clarity, and resulting simplicity in this method, however, proves far 
more difficult than apparent.178 While all embellishment—in tone, gesture, and 
organization—is avoided in Attic presentation, there remains an elusive charm—an 
“elegance and neatness”—that is like the beauty of a woman who is more attractive 
without ornament.179 To this extent the charm of Attic speech may be considered 
contrived—just insofar as the Attic speaker commands elegance with the knowledge 
of the spare beauty that results from the avoidance of ploy.
In contrast to the precision and restraint of the Attic orator, Cicero argues that 
the best orators vary their voices to move their audiences: “The perfect orator ... will 
use certain tones according as he wishes to seem himself to be moved and to sway 
the minds of his audience.”180 Commanding his voice with greater skill, the best 
orator varies his voice to better convey the feeling of his speech, striving to “speak 
intensely with a vehement tone, and gently with a lowered voice, and to show 
169 Robert Hariman, Political Style in Cicero’s Letters to Atticus, 7 Rhetocia: J. Hist. 
Rhetoric 145, 149–50 (1989).
170 Id.
171 Cicero, Orator, supra note 153, at viii.28.
172 Id. at xxiv.82.
173 Id. at xxvi.85.
174 Id. at xxiii.77.
175 Id.
176 Id. at viii.28.
177 Id. at xxiii.76.
178 Id.
179 Id. at xxiv.79.
180 Id. at xviii.55.
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dignity in a deep voice, and wretchedness by a plaintiff tone.”181 Cicero further 
elaborates, explaining that “the superior orator will therefore vary and modulate 
his voice; now raising and now lowering it, he will run through the whole scale 
of tones.”182 Indeed, Cicero once boasted to a friend that he could “boom away,” 
joking that his friend might have heard the “reverberations” in another town.183 
Similarly, Cicero’s gestures show no restraint; he admits that “we are wont to use it 
so piteously that we have even held a babe in our arms during the peroration, and 
in another plea for a noble defendant we told him to stand up, and raising his small 
son we filled the forum with wailing and lamentation.”184
Compared to this visceral appeal lauded by Cicero, the Attic orator’s “style 
lacks the vigor and sting necessary for oratorical efforts in public life.”185 He accuses 
the Attic orators of conversing with scholars, preferring to soothe minds than to 
arouse passions.186 They instruct rather than captivate.187 Describing the approach 
of philosophers and Attic speakers together, he claims that their speech is “gentle 
and academic; it has no equipment of words or phrases that catch the popular fancy 
. . . there is no anger in it, no hatred, no ferocity, no pathos, no shrewdness; it might 
be called a chaste, pure and modest virgin.”188 Put another way, the Attic speaker 
uses a refined but conversational approach.189
The divergence between the two styles in their focus on reason versus passion 
is particularly prominent in Brutus, in which Cicero portrays a conversation 
between himself and two Attici friends. One of his interlocutors, Brutus, confirms 
the strong Attic identification of sound thought with good rhetoric, claiming that 
“no one can be a good speaker who is not a sound thinker.”190 As Brutus sees it, 
“whoever devotes himself to true eloquence, devotes himself to sound thinking.”191 
By contrast, Cicero’s comments reveal that it is not clarity or power of thought that 
he values most highly. According to Cicero the “proper and legitimate functions of 
the orator” are “to digress from the business in hand for embellishment, to delight 
his listeners, to move them, to amplify his theme, to use pathos.”192 Indeed, directly 
comparing the two approaches, Cicero finds inflaming the passions far more 
important: “One may conclude, that of the two chief qualities which the orator must 
possess, accurate argument looking to proof and impressive appeal to the emotions 
of the listener, the orator who inflames the court accomplishes far more than the 
one who merely instructs it.”193 Numerous passages in Brutus evaluate famous 
181 Id. at xviii.56–57.
182 Id. at xviii.59.
183 Hariman, supra note 169, at 150. 
184 Cicero, Orator, supra note 153, at xxxviii.131.
185 Id. at xix.62–63.
186 Id. at xix.63.
187 Id.
188 Id. at xix.64.
189 Id.
190 Cicero, Brutus, in Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ: Bʀᴜᴛᴜs, Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀ 1, vi.23 (Loeb Ed., Jeffrey Hendrickson ed., 
G. L. Hendrickson & H. M. Hubbell trans., 1962) (46 B.C.).
191 Id.
192 Id. at xxi.82.
193 Id. at xxiii.89. A similar contention is repeated near the end of the Brutus, when Cicero 
argues that “the one supreme characteristic of the orator” is to “sway his feelings in 
whatever direction the situation demanded.” Id. at xciii.322. Note that Cicero refers to 
swaying feelings and not to engaging the judge’s reason. 
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Roman Attic orators and reinforce Cicero’s preference for emotional appeal over 
logic and reason: he critiques their ability to persuade while offering qualified 
praise of the bare, lucid, straight, calm, restrained, and scholarly virtues of Attic 
speakers.194
Through skillful employment of voice and word choice, the best orators 
persuade by commanding the passions of their audience.195 Indeed, the passion-
oriented aspect of Cicero’s approach directs more than the use of the voice: it 
permits the orator—with a good end in mind, to be sure—to abandon truth for the 
sake of persuasion.196 Where the Attic orator focuses on using evidence and logic 
to win over the audience’s reason, the Ciceronian approach employs the combined 
force of elaborate organization, distracting gesture and varied voice, intermixed 
with emotional ploys to the end of persuading the listener’s passions. This 
distinction in method—and the distinction in mindset that creates this distinction in 
method—reveals why Cicero judged the Attic orator less powerful. 
3. Unvaried Rhetoric, Regardless of Audience or Occasion
In his descriptions and praise of the best oratory, Cicero argues that optimal 
persuasion requires adjustment for topic, audience, and occasion.197 As discussed 
above, the Attic orator has a narrow repertoire: there is little or no variation in 
tone, gesture, organization, word choice, or other device. This is important within a 
single speech—where Attic rhetoric will seem plain in comparison to the dramatic 
highs and lows of a Cicero. But the Attic adherence to simple and straightforward 
presentation also creates a necessary uniformity in all speeches, making it 
impossible for the speaker to adjust argument and style to changing audiences, 
topics, and times. In other words, with uniformly simple word choice and a logical, 
passion-eschewing focus, the Attic orator necessarily lacks the quality that Cicero 
thinks most important for a great orator. 
Cicero elaborates on this quality of the best orators throughout the Orator. 
As he understands it, the orator’s judgment must be shaped by the judgment of the 
audience: “The eloquence of orators has always been controlled by the good sense 
of the audience, since all who desire to win approval have regard to the goodwill 
of their auditors, and shape and adapt themselves completely according to this and 
to their opinion and approval.”198 Hence, in contrast to the unvarying presentation 
of the Attic orator, Cicero argues that the best orators will exercise judgment to 
determine which words and delivery will be most effective in a particular context 
and on a particular topic.199 In his opinion, this requires “rare judgment and great 
endowment,” showing the wisdom of the superior orator.200 This approach rests on 
the observation that the orator’s potential to persuade is bound by the beliefs and 
194 Id. at lxxxv.262, lxxx.276–279, ixxxii.283–84.
195 Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, Dick. L. Rev. 85, 94–98 (1994).
196 Gary Remer, The Classical Orator as Political Representative: Cicero and the Modern 
Concept of Representation, 72 J. Pol. 1063, 1072 (2010).
197 Frost, supra note 195, at 92, 98–99.
198 Cicero, Orator, supra note 153, at viii.24.
199 Daniel J. Kapust & Michelle A. Schwarze, The Rhetoric of Sincerity: Cicero and Smith 
on Propriety and Political Context, 110 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 100, 103 (2016).
200 Cicero, Orator, supra note 153, at xxi.70.
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values of the audience; hence, he concludes that the speaker—to be effective—must 
make appeals bound by the community’s beliefs.201 
As a practical matter, this approach dictates that the orator shift style “in any 
way which the case requires.”202 The best approach alters depending on both the 
speaker’s and the audience’s condition, rank, position, and age.203 The topic itself 
will also require tailoring, so the orator “can discuss commonplace matters simply, 
lofty subjects impressively, and topics ranging between in a tempered style.”204 
Nothing less than “wisdom” guides the great orator to adapt to occasion and 
audience so that a “rich subject will not be treated meagerly, nor a grand subject 
in a paltry way, nor vice versa, but the speech will be proper and adequate to the 
subject.”205
These are not tactics that the Attic orator is willing to embrace. They defy the 
very definition of Attic rhetoric. As Cicero views it, the Attic orator’s insistence 
on simple, accurate language and rational discourse undermines the orator’s very 
purpose—persuasion. Without either the ability or the willingness to use the 
most powerful weapons of persuasion, Attic orators opt instead for a reserve that 
dooms them to make futile—if accurate, reasonable, and honest—appeals to their 
audiences. 
B. The Attic Rhetoric of Atticus Finch
Throughout To Kill a Mockingbird, Lee presents her Attic orator—Atticus 
Finch—speaking in the same tone and employing the same unembellished but 
precise phrases and logical arguments regardless of the context and audience. 
In other words, the story’s narrator, Scout, describes her father as a thoroughly 
Attic orator without ever making the reference openly. Scholarly literature on 
Atticus Finch has not yet connected his name to the school of rhetoric that he 
employs, and consideration of the character’s name—to date—has focused on 
either the word’s Greek origin and Roman use or on a potential connection with 
a Roman known as Atticus (discussed below). One might expect that Lee, whose 
novel surely elicited its share of public interest, might have spoken publicly to her 
unusual choice of name. Therefore, before detailing the textual evidence for the 
connection between Atticus and Attic rhetoric, I briefly examine the scant—and 
ultimately inconclusive—clues left by Lee. 
201 Remer, supra note 196, at 1072.
202 Cicero, Orator, supra note 153, at xxi.70.
203 Id. at xxi.71.
204 Id. at xxviii.100–101.
205 Id. at xxxv.123–xxxv.124. Cicero expresses the same opinion in several of his works; 
Cɪᴄᴇʀᴏ, Dᴇ Oᴘᴛɪᴍᴏ Gᴇɴᴇʀᴇ Oʀᴀᴛᴏʀᴜᴍ, supra note 154, at III.8–IV.10 (praising 
Demosthenes because he could speak with passion or calmly and critiquing the Attic 
Lysias because he could not speak passionately); Cicero, De Partitone Oratoria v.15 
(Loeb ed., H. Rackham trans., 1942) (54 B.C.) (“the prudent and cautious speaker is 
controlled by the reception given by his audience—what it rejects has to be modified”).
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1. Lee’s Extra-Textual Indications
Analysis of Lee’s intent invariably runs into a serious obstacle: She shunned public 
view, and she seems to have left as little external evidence about her book as 
possible.206 She never approved of a biography,207 her attorney had her will sealed 
from public view,208 and indeed she never conducted any public interviews after 
the mid-1960s.209 Her very rare public comments after the last public interview 
did not directly relate to her first famous novel: in recent years she denounced the 
last biography published before she died210 and then endorsed publication of Go 
Set the Watchman in the year before her death.211 Of course, her reticence to come 
into public view only raised the stakes: efforts have been made to capture her life 
and the connections between her life and her characters. Because she never chose 
to participate, however, these efforts amounted to extensive excavation with little 
result—if result is measured in terms of clear illumination of her novel and its 
conscious influences.212
206 Garrison Keillor, Good Scout: A Biography of Harper Lee, a Writer Comfortable with 
Her Accomplishment, N.Y. Times Book Rev., June 11, 2006, at F11 (book review) 
(“[S]he didn’t enjoy the limelight. So she backed away from celebrity, declined to be 
interviewed or to be honorifically degreed and simply lived her life”); Julia M. Klein, 
“The Mockingbird Next Door” by Marja Mills, Bos. Globe (July 12, 2014), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/arts/books/2014/07/12/review-the-mockingbird-next-door-life-
with-harper-lee-marja-mills/EwniyOr6IgcXVH0rXkPp4O/story.html (book review) 
(Lee “shunned reporters and biographers, and encouraged her close associates not to 
talk to outsiders”).
207 The author of the last biography published in Lee’s lifetime, Marja Mills, claimed to have 
Lee’s approval, but Lee publicly released a letter with the following blanket statement: 
“Rest assured, as long as I am alive any book purporting to be with my cooperation 
is a falsehood.” Steven Levingston, Harper Lee: New Portrait is a “Falsehood,” 
Washington Post, July 16, 2014, at C01; Julie Bosman, Author of Memoir About 
Harper Lee Insists She Had Lee’s Cooperation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2011, at C3; Dwight 
Garner, To Kill A Friendship, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2014, at C19.
208 Jennifer Crossley Howard, Judge Seals Harper Lee’s Will from Public’s Scrutiny, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 5, 2016, at A11. When reporters from the New York Times succeeded in 
having the will unsealed, Alabama papers reported that the will, signed a week before 
her death, placed the bulk of her fortune in a trust shielded from public view. Editorial, 
Harper Lee’s Unwanted Attention, Anniston Star (Ala.), Feb. 28, 2018, at editorials. 
No public announcements have been made regarding the disposition of any personal 
papers that Lee may have saved. 
209 Bosman, supra note 207 (reporting that, as of 2011, Lee had not given a public interview 
in forty-five years). 
210 Howard, supra note 208. 
211 Alexandra Alter & Serge F. Kovaleski, In Statement, Harper Lee Backs New Novel, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 5, 2015, at A13; Alexandra Alter & Serge F. Kovaleski, After Harper Lee 
Novel Surfaces, Plots Arise, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2015, at A1.
212 For example, the first and the best known biography, Charles J. Shields’s Mockingbird: 
A Portrait of Harper Lee, paints a thorough backdrop of her life (through the date of 
its completion), but—lacking access to Lee or her papers (if they exist)—he cannot 
convincingly do more than guess about the connections between the author’s life events 
and her novel’s content. Charles J. Shields, Mockingbird: A Portrait of Harper 
Lee (2007); see also Meghan O’Rourke, One-Hit Wonder: The Life Story of the Woman 
Who Wrote One of America’s Most Beloved Novels, Washington Post, July 23, 2006, at 
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In one obscure interview, given in 1962 to the Birmingham Post Herald, 
Lee dropped her most direct statement indicating an inspiration for Atticus.213 In 
an awkwardly written, partially quoted and partially paraphrased statement, she 
indicated that the inspiration for her character’s name was “the Greek known by 
that name – ‘wise, learned and humane man.’”214 This most likely refers to a Roman 
who lived in Greece, Titus Pomponius Atticus, a close friend of Cicero. 215 Most 
of our knowledge of this historical Atticus comes from letters that he and Cicero 
exchanged (nearly all surviving letters in their voluminous correspondence are 
Cicero’s) and a brief biography by Roman historian Cornelius Nepos.216 Little is 
known about how Lee learned about Atticus: she may well have encountered him 
independently in her own reading. On the other hand, while the universities she 
attended have not released details, she may have been introduced to Cicero, Atticus, 
or some other author who referred to one of them through her undergraduate studies 
at the University of Alabama, her year of law school, or a summer literature program 
that she attended at Oxford University.217
Among those who have attempted to explain the origin of Atticus’s name, 
there seem to be two opinions. Some vaguely tie the name to its ancient origins, 
connecting the character to the republican principles either of Attic Greece or of 
Rome.218 Others, inspired by Lee’s 1962 interview comment, point to Cicero’s 
friend, the Roman named Titus Pomponius Atticus.219 Titus Atticus, a boyhood 
friend of Cicero, studied law alongside Cicero but never practiced.220 Instead, he 
choose to live in Greece—in Attica—and pursue literary and business affairs in a 
life of relative retirement compared to the political turmoil of Rome.221 Thus, while 
BW15 (“In the absence of reliable data from which to forge a coherent narrative, Shields 
follows his research down many a cul de sac and pads out trivial details”). Marja Mill’s 
The Mockingbird Next Door, the most famous of the biographies, was renounced by 
Lee herself, effectively removing it from candidacy as a trustworthy source. See supra 
note 207. Most recently, Joseph Crespino has released Atticus Finch: The Biography, a 
detailed portrait of Lee’s father that purports to tell the fuller story of Atticus Finch, but—
once again—while many interesting facts have been unearthed, conclusive evidence 
remains beyond our grasp because we simply do not know the intent with which Lee 
translated life to novel. Joseph Crespino, Atticus Finch: The Biography (2018). 
213 Ramona Allison, “Mockingbird” Author is Alabama’s “Woman of Year,” Birmingham 
Post-Herald, Jan. 3, 1962, at 12.
214 Id.
215 Pomponius Atticus, Titus, Oxford Classical Dictionary (4th ed. 2012).
216 Id.
217 Shields, supra note 212, at 83–111. I contacted officials at the University of Alabama 
and Oxford to request details about the programs pursued by Lee. Neither institution was 
able to provide any information.
218 Maureen E. Markey, Natural Law, Positive Law, And Conflicting Social Norms in 
Harper Lee’s To Kill A Mockingbird, 32 N.C. Cᴇɴᴛ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 162, 170–71 (2010); William 
J. Chriss, The Noble Lawyer Paradigm, 75 Tᴇx. B. J. 50, 52–53 (2012).
219 Calvin Woodard, Listening to the Mockingbird, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 563, 573–74 (1994); 
Sʜɪᴇʟᴅs, supra note 212, at 114; Crespino, supra note 212, at xiv. 
220 Steel, supra note 146, at 10–13; Harry L. Levy, Cicero the Lawyer as Seen in His 
Correspondence, 52 Classical World 147, 150 (1959); Mary Bradford Peaks, Cicero 
and American Lawyers, 22 Classical J. 563, 570 (1927).
221 Steel, supra note 146, at 10–13. One enticing fact about Titus Atticus’s potential role as 
a source for Atticus Finch is that Titus’s slaves, even his footmen, were literate. Id. at 12. 
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the Atticus of history does not undermine Lee’s respect for the figure, his biography 
hardly provides a full explanation of his connection to Atticus Finch.
Some see in Lee’s father, Amasa Coleman Lee, a model for the character of 
Atticus. Shortly after the publication of To Kill a Mockingbird, Lee noted that she 
wrote Atticus as she thought of her father, as someone “who has genuine humility 
and a natural dignity. He has absolutely no ego drive, and so he is one of the most 
beloved men in this part of the state.”222 The identification of Lee’s father as a 
possible source for Atticus Finch also rests on similarities between Atticus and 
Amasa, including the fact that both were lawyers in Alabama, both had defended 
African American clients accused of felonies, and both men effectively served as 
single parents to precocious children.223 Most recently, Joseph Crespino’s Atticus 
Finch: A Biography retells the story of Atticus Finch by starting with the story of 
Amasa.224 In his retelling, Crespino focuses on points of similarity between Amasa 
and Atticus while gliding quietly past significant points of difference.225 
In sum, both Amasa Coleman Lee and Titus Pomponius Atticus appear to 
claim rightful status as partial sources from which Lee created the Atticus Finch of 
To Kill a Mockingbird. Nonetheless, neither provides so neat a fit that those seeking 
to understand the literary character ought to cease seeking for additional insight. 
Indeed, the oft repeated references to her father and the ancient Roman provide 
very little insight into the inner workings of Atticus: this may be why—Crespino’s 
biography aside—these links often garner very little attention in literary and legal 
(as opposed to historical) analyses of To Kill a Mockingbird. The schoolchild who 
reads To Kill a Mockingbird knows that Lee portrays Atticus as a man she loves 
and respects. Adding the information that he was modeled on a noble Roman and 
Lee’s father supports this conclusion, but it does not enrich it. Much less does it 
help schoolchildren and lawyers understand what steps to take to integrate Atticus’s 
admirable qualities into their own lives and professional pursuits. 
2. Lee’s Atticus Finch
Looking to the book she left to the public—rather than prying into the life she 
clearly tried to shield from public view—one finds a more important connection 
between character and real-world inspiration. With the features of Attic rhetoric 
in mind, one has the power to unlock Atticus’s ability to wield the most important 
tool of the lawyer with the utmost power, integrity, and respect for others. Atticus 
Finch uses Attic rhetoric to represent and counsel his client, to serve as a respectful 
but challenging officer of the court, and—with the lives of three children in the 
balance—to defend one man’s right to trial in the face of a lynch mob. Through 
Atticus, Lee demonstrates that Attic rhetoric is more than useful: it is necessary in 
the moments when attorney duties are in tension with each other. Through Attic 
Calpurnia, Atticus’s housekeeper and nanny, estimates that only about four individuals 
in her African American congregation can read; Calpurnia and her grown son, Zeebo, 
account for half this number. Lee, supra note 61 at 165–66.
222 Talmage Boston, Who Was Atticus Finch?, 73 Tᴇx. B. J. 484, 484–487 (2010). 
223 Id.
224 Crespino, supra note 212, at xvii. 
225 The first chapter, where Crespino covers Amasa’s early career, is a good example of this 
quality. Id. at 3–30. 
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rhetoric an attorney uses his most fundamental tool to navigate ethical duties to 
client, to court, and to justice—and thus also to his own conscience. Through Attic 
rhetoric an attorney has a path to wholeness. 
Lee underscores the Attic qualities of Atticus’s speech throughout the novel, 
but the character’s Attic qualities become most apparent when one compares how 
his accurate, rational approach pervades his speech regardless of topic, audience, 
and occasion. Whether with his children or in court, he uses his legal vocabulary, 
but in both contexts he refrains from embellishment, distraction, and drama. His 
tone is conversational and level in both contexts, and no listener could doubt that 
logic and accuracy bear more of his attention than delivery. A man who thus speaks 
accurately, simply, calmly, and rationally as father and defense attorney can hardly 
help but qualify as an Attic orator. Cicero would doubtless disagree, but To Kill 
a Mockingbird shows that Atticus’s rhetorical style is key to his ability to remain 
simultaneously true to himself and to his ethical duties. 
Atticus’s lawyerly word choice when speaking to his children may at first 
seem to defy categorization as Attic. For example, when he refuses to spit-shake 
with his daughter after they reach a compromise, he tells her, “We’ll consider 
it sealed without the usual formality.” 226 Similarly, when he asks her not to tell 
her teacher about their plan to read together at night, his answer when Scout 
asks for an explanation seems unduly complex. Atticus explains, “I’m afraid our 
activities would be received with considerable disapprobation by the more learned 
authorities.” 227 Indeed, Scout explains that Atticus often speaks to his children in 
the same “last will and testament diction” that he uses as an attorney.228 In perhaps 
the most extreme example, when seven-year-old Scout asks what rape is, he gives 
her the precise legal definition: “carnal knowledge of a female by force without her 
consent.”229
Atticus speaks to his children using his professional language, but can this style 
be described as simple, accurate, and rational? Although it may not immediately be 
evident, the answer to this question is “yes” because Atticus explains the world 
to his children in the simplest possible accurate terms. When Atticus explains the 
world to his children, he does not evade or lie even in the face of the most difficult 
questions. Because he thereby refuses to sacrifice accuracy to youth, the result is 
word choice that is advanced relative to the age of his audience. But the result is 
also a sometimes startling degree of honesty. As he explains to his brother Jack, 
“When a child asks you something, answer him, for goodness’ sake ... . Children 
are children, but they can spot an evasion quicker than adults and evasion simply 
muddles ’em.”230 Accordingly, Atticus explains the logic and failings of family, 
neighbors, town, trials, and the law to Jem and Scout as they question him over the 
course of the book. 
Because he speaks to his children as if they were adults, Atticus is able to 
honestly explain the realities of life in their racist town, the dictates of his conscience, 
and the complexities of the law to his children with only the complexity that reality 
226 Lee, supra note 61, at 42.
227 Id.
228 Id. For example, Atticus tricks his son, Jem, into confessing disobedience using “the 
oldest lawyer’s trick on record.” Id. at 66. 
229 Id. at 181.
230 Id. at 116.
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requires. He never diverts their youthful attention or sacrifices honesty to innocence. 
Hence, Atticus’s lawyerly speech with his children supports his categorization as 
an Attic orator because his speech bears the hallmark adherence to the simplest 
accurate style regardless of audience, topic, and context. As Scout explains to 
her neighbor, Miss Maudie, Atticus’s behavior is the same in private and public: 
“Atticus don’t ever do anything to Jem and me in the house that he don’t do in 
the yard.”231 Miss Maudie immediately agrees with Scout’s observation, explaining 
that “Atticus Finch is the same in his house as he is on the public street.”232 
Once Atticus steps into the courtroom his simple accuracy and focus on 
logic—which can be difficult to grasp in the context of conversation with 
a child—becomes apparent. As a litigator, Atticus is the model of simplicity, 
restraint, precision, and logical appeal. As detailed in II.B., he refuses to thunder, 
employing the language and tone of his daily life.233 He approaches the rape trial 
at the center of the novel, the focal point of personal and political turmoil and 
injustice, with as much restraint as any real estate transaction.234 No more in court 
than at home has Scout ever heard Atticus raise his voice. Scout reports of herself 
and Jem, “We acquired no traumas from watching our father win or lose. . . . I never 
heard Atticus raise his voice in my life, except to a deaf witness.”235 The judge 
confirms Scout’s account, explaining to one overwrought witness that “we’ve done 
business in this court for years and years, and Mr. Finch is always courteous to 
everybody. . . . he’s trying to be polite. That’s just his way.”236 
By the end of the trial, Scout has shown us a concise, sometimes detached, 
reasonable man handling what he has earlier told his daughter will be the most trying 
case of his life. In his closing argument, he remains—as he has been throughout—
moderate, logical, and straightforward.
Atticus was speaking easily, with the kind of detachment that he 
used when he dictated a letter. He walked slowly up and down 
in front of the jury, and the jury seemed attentive: their heads 
were up and they followed Atticus’s route with what seemed to be 
appreciation. I guess it was because Atticus wasn’t a thunderer.237
Atticus Finch is an Attic orator through and through. In the moment when his 
address to the jury becomes the most impassioned (if one can even use that word), it 
simply becomes more like his private tone: “‘Gentlemen,’ he said. Jem and I again 
looked at each other: Atticus might have said, ‘Scout.’”238 In his conversational 
address to the jury, Atticus consistently conveys a prioritization of thought over 
delivery. 
Atticus’s simple, direct, and even-toned speech is also logical, precise, and 
wise. If ever Atticus reveals the elegance and spare beauty of the Attic approach, it 
231 Id. at 61.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 226.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 229.
236 Id. at 242.
237 Id. at 270.
238 Id. at 271.
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is in his closing statement when he patiently instructs the jury on the necessity of 
equality in the courtroom. Knowing full well the bigotry of the jury, he nonetheless 
looks these fellow citizens in the eye and addresses them as rational human 
beings—as peers who can reason their way through the logical explanation that he 
sets before them in black and white.239 
We know all men are not created equal in the sense that some 
people would have us believe—some people are smarter than 
others, some people have more opportunity because they’re born 
with it, some men make more money than others, some ladies bake 
better cakes than others—some people are born gifted beyond the 
normal scope of most men.
But there is one way in this country in which all men are created 
equal—there is one human institution that makes a pauper the 
equal of a Rockefeller, the stupid man the equal of an Einstein, 
and the ignorant man the equal of any college president. It can 
be the Supreme Court of the United States or the humblest J.P. 
court in the land, or this honorable court which you serve. Our 
courts have their faults, as does any human institution, but in this 
country our courts are the great levelers, and in our courts all men 
are created equal.240 
Of course, Atticus’s honest logic loses the trial at the heart of To Kill a Mockingbird: 
the jury convicts innocent Tom Robinson. Atticus pins his hopes on the rationality 
of the appeals process, but should he have employed the full spectrum of rhetorical 
skills that Hume and Cicero praise to save his client? Or, to describe the choice 
in concrete terms, should he have played on the jury’s passions to convince them, 
using every tone and embellishment that Cicero could muster, that Mayella was a 
“loose woman” and then shed pathetic tears over Tom’s children? Perhaps if he had 
thundered a bit (surely a man of his education and training could have intimidated 
and frightened a girl who had never seen the inside of school), Mayella might have 
broken. Or maybe he could have convinced the already-racist jury that Tom was too 
cowardly to have committed the crime. And Tom might have walked. 
This difficult question is at the heart of the tension between an attorney’s 
simultaneous duties of zealous advocacy and as an officer of the court and as a 
citizen with responsibility for the quality of justice. No less, this question strikes 
at the heart of democratic deliberation and the potential for reason to prevail over 
passion. It also touches on the potential for an attorney to maintain integrity and 
honesty while serving the client’s best interests. Faced with a situation like that 
of Atticus, attorneys can make the legal system better by appealing to reason and 
trusting the rational capacity of their fellow citizens. Or they can make it worse by 
stirring vicious passions, feeding on human bias, and failing to maintain honesty 
with the court and all present. What Atticus told the jurors in his plea to their 
reason—that the integrity of the system depends on those who make it up—is no 
239 Id.
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less true for attorneys than for jurors.241 When Atticus adheres to appeals to reason, 
he takes a necessary but insufficient step—a prerequisite step—to a jury’s ability 
to listen to reason rather than passion. Atticus’s Attic appeal is not sufficient for the 
not-guilty verdict dictated by reason, but—like his presence at the jail in the face 
of the lynch mob—it is a necessary preliminary step before a rational deliberation 
process can occur. 
Lee confirms this interpretation by revealing the conversion of the one 
juror won over by Atticus Finch.242 As Atticus explains, the only juror to argue 
for acquittal was a member of the Cunningham family and a relative to Walter 
Cunningham—the would-be lyncher who at Scout’s prompting led the mob to 
abandon their intention and head for home.243 The Cunningham juror, standing 
alone, had argued for acquittal for hours.244 By drawing a connection between 
these two Cunninghams, Lee suggests a relationship between Atticus’s ability to 
persuade the leader of the dissolution of the lynch mob and Atticus’s persuasion of 
the one juror who attempted to bring the jury to a not-guilty verdict. 
Atticus loses the trial, but—because he is the same man in and out of court, 
before his children and before the town and jury—he wins the mind of one juror, 
one citizen, and one neighbor to his side of the issue. Atticus’s integrity, an integrity 
incompatible with the passionate, ever-changing persuasion of the Ciceronian 
orator, changes one citizen and thereby makes Maycomb that much closer to a 
just society. Nonetheless, as advocates, as officers of the court, and as citizens, we 
are left asking whether this is enough. The answer that each individual gives to 
this question dictates their rhetorical choices and the extent to which they find the 
courage not only to admire but also to emulate the Attic rhetoric of Atticus Finch. 
This interpretation is further confirmed by consideration of Lee’s own literary 
choices in the style of To Kill a Mockingbird. This novel adopts so restrained—so 
Attic—a style of rhetoric that one might be tempted to dismiss it as an important 
contribution to justice. But, like Atticus, Lee used this rhetorical style to win slow, 
long-term gains. In her case, generations of schoolchildren have been persuaded 
to adopt one pivotal idea: that all humans ought to be equal before the law. Lee 
forwarded this moderate (but essential) proposition without raising her literary 
voice, without invective, and in rational language equally well suited to children 
and adults. The moderation of her rhetoric ought not to blind us to the inestimable 
importance of winning the minds of future voting citizens to beliefs foundational 
to basic rights (and therefore to even greater strides). Indeed, the moderate nature 
of her rhetoric, far from being a sign of weakness, ought to be understood for the 
powerful tool that she showed it to be: Lee won over and continues to win over 
her fellow citizen without polarizing, preserving the potential for friendship and 
community—prerequisites for rational discourse and future persuasion between 
citizens. Not least of all, her hero—Atticus Finch—has inspired generations of 
lawyers to be better advocates, officers of the court, and citizens. 
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Rhetoric in Fulfillment of Duties to Client, to Court, to Society, and to Self
Conclusion
Finding the origin of Atticus’s name does more than solve the mystery of the hero’s 
unusual title. Atticus Finch’s Attic rhetoric is key to understanding how he so 
inspiringly fulfills an attorney’s ethical obligations while retaining his own self-
respect. It provides the logic underpinning Lee’s many descriptions of Atticus’s 
words and demeanor so that Atticus’s position as a model attorney can be more 
justly reevaluated. As an attorney, Atticus is “a representative of clients, an officer 
of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice.” His Attic example demonstrates the mutual compatibility of these 
constituent elements of an attorney’s identity. Similarly, Atticus’s speech allows 
him to harmonize the duties of honesty and integrity that coexist with the duties of 
zealous advocacy for his client. As an individual, the integrity dictated by his Attic 
approach to speech enables him to navigate treacherous times without sacrificing 
his conscience to practical expediency. Atticus’s speech shows us how all this is 
possible. Never overwhelming the intellect of his listener with passionate appeal, 
reasoning honestly and equally with all, and humbly offering his client (and his 
children and neighbors) the benefit of his razor-sharp intelligence, Atticus’s Attic 
rhetoric is the answer to many seeming quandaries about the ethical boundaries of 
the lawyer’s life. 
Cicero and Hume dismissed the Attic orator’s logic as relatively weak, 
recommending instead reliance on the orator’s ability to play skillfully on the 
passions of the audience. But Atticus reveals that Attic orators are necessary if 
the judiciary is to function as intended: as a rational dispute-resolution process. 
Atticus thereby serves as a role model for those attorneys who wish to pursue 
the common good with honesty and integrity. Even-toned Atticus thus provides 
a healthy counterpoint to the profession’s fears of ethical incoherence. His Attic 
rhetoric offers us a path to issue-focused, rational, and respectful dialogue between 
adversaries.
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